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ABSTRACT

Defending Data proposes a data-driven, systems-based approach to
improving public defense in America. Public defenders represent millions
of defendants every year. Yet public defense remains a largely data-less
enterprise, a black box of discretionary decisions disconnected from any
systemic analysis about the relationship between defender practices and
case outcomes. Defending Data adopts a novel approach to the crisis of
public defense. Building off of the successful implementation of systembased approaches in other complex, high-risk industries such as aviation
and medicine, Defending Data explains how defenders can develop a datadriven systems approach to public defense.
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INTRODUCTION
Public defenders represent millions of defendants every year. 1 Yet
public defense remains a largely data-less enterprise, a black box of
discretionary decisions disconnected from any systemic analysis about the
relationship between defender practices and case outcomes. 2 No data
systems record and analyze the factors that increase legal risk or improve
attorney performance. Instead, public defenders trust that their diligence
and zeal will optimize client outcomes.
1. DONALD J. FAROLE, JR. & LYNN LANGTON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, NCJ 228229, CENSUS OF PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007: STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
PROGRAMS, 2007 (Sept. 2010), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/spdp07.pdf; DONALD J. FAROLE,
JR. & LYNN LANGTON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 231175, CENSUS
OF PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007: COUNTY-BASED AND LOCAL PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007
(Sept. 2010), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/clpdo07.pdf.
2. See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright & Ralph A. Peeples, Criminal Defense Lawyer Moneyball: A
Demonstration Project, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1221, 1230 (2013) (recognizing that while "a few
public defender services collect agency-wide statistics that track levels of attorney activity and early
contact with clients, such as frequency of visitation with clients during the earliest phases of the
representation," most have no systemic data collection system); Marea Beeman, Using Data to Sustain
and Improve Public Defense Programs, JUST. MGMT. INST. I (Aug. 31, 2012),
http://texaswcl.tamu.edu/reports/2012_ JMI _Using_Data_in_Public_Defense. pdf [hereinafter Beeman,
Using Data] ("Despite the value that data have for improving indigent defense, relatively little is known
nationally about the types of data typically collected by defenders, how these data are managed and
analyzed, and how best to use data."). But see James M. Doyle, Learning from Error in American
Criminal Justice, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 113 (2010) (characterizing Innocence
Commissions as preliminary collaborative efforts to "mobilize the experiences of medicine and
aviation" by gathering data about criminal justice error in order to reduce future error). Doyle urges, as
we do, a "sustained practice of learning from error." Id. at 110. However, whereas Doyle urges
collaboration among criminal justice stakeholders, we argue that the challenges of adversarial practice
require defenders to develop a systems approach that focuses on improving client outcomes, rather than
broader criminal justice goals, such as accuracy and public safety. See infra Part II.C. l.
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While data increasingly influence the delivery of services in high-risk
industries such as medicine, aviation, and engineering, public defenders
have largely resisted systematized, data-driven approaches to improving the
delivery of indigent defense services.3 When public defenders collect data,
they generally do so at the behest of hostile legislatures or regulatory
agencies that measure efficiency rather than effectiveness. Instead of
assembling empirical evidence about best practices, public defenders rely
on experience, gut instinct, and individual talent. 4 The prevailing ethos
remains that defending is "art," not science, and data is anathema to the
3. See James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? The
Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154, 209 (2012) ("Other
professions and industries ... appear to be far ahead of the legal profession in trying to design systems
that do not depend upon the characteristics of the individual professional to reach a reliable outcome.
The legal profession's heroizing of the fiercely independent solo practitioner may exacerbate this
danger and serve as an obstacle to a more systems-based approach." (footnotes omitted)).
4. There is, however, an emerging interest in data-driven practice among academics and policymakers. For instance, the 2014 American Society of Criminology Conference featured several sessions
on data analysis and outcome assessment in indigent defense. Papers from this conference are available
in the 2015 Miscarriages of Justice volume of the Albany Law Review, which is jointly sponsored with
the SUNY University at Albany's School of Criminal Justice. These six articles address the "new
community of social scientists, legal scholars, practicing defenders, government employees, and others,
all of whom are dedicated to research and data in the arena of public defense." Andrew Lucas Blaize
Davies, Editor's Introduction: How Do We "Do Data" in Public Defense?, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1179, 1183
(2015).
Additionally, Professors Janet Moore and Andrew Davies have formed the Indigent Defense
Research Association, a national organization of researchers and practitioners dedicated to collecting,
developing, and implementing data-driven approaches to indigent defense. See also Cara H. Drinan,
Getting Real About Gideon: The Next Fifty Years of Enforcing the Right to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1309, 1323 (2013) ("The National Legal Aid & Defender Association (NLADA) has developed
a committee of academics and practitioners whose charge is to identify best practices regarding
defender data collection and to disseminate this information nationally."); Jennifer E. Laurin, Gideon
By the Numbers: The Emergence of Evidence-Based Practice in Indigent Defense, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRJM .
L. 325, 336 (2015) ("Imagine a research environment in which criminologists not only disagreed on
whether arrests prevented crime, but also on whether crime prevention was a proper quality metric for
policing, or one in which not only was the link between incarceration and nonrecidivism unknown, but
the value of non-recidivism disputed."). In addition, the Department of Justice, through the National
Institute of Justice and the Bureau of Justice Affairs, has begun funding grants for pilot projects that
focus on data and evidence-driven projects. See, e.g., Indigent Defense Research, NAT'L INST. JUST.,
http://www.nij.gov/topics/courts/indigent-defense/Pages/research.aspx (last visited June 28, 2015);
Answering Gideon 's Call: National Assistance to Improve the Effectiveness of Right to Counsel
Services FY 2013 Competitive Grant Announcements, U.S. DEP'T JUST. (Mar. 21 , 2013),
https://www.bja.gov/Funding/13AnsweringGideonsCallSol.pdf (citing examples of funding grants). See
also JAMES DOYLE, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, NCJ 247141 , MENDING JUSTICE: SENTINEL EVENT
REVIEWS 3-5 (2014 ), http://www.nij.gov/topics/justice-system/pages/mending-justice.aspx [hereinafter
DOYLE, MENDING JUSTICE]; Marea Beeman, Basic Data Every Defender Needs to Track: A Toolkit for
Defender Leaders, NAT' L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS' N 5-7 (Oct. 27, 2014),
http://www.nladalOOyears.org/node/16310 [hereinafter Beeman, Basic Data Toolkit].
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complex, fact-specific, and human considerations of a particular case. 5
This Article challenges defenders to rethink their attitudes about data
collection and performance measures. While data alone canno~ perfect a
single, grand solution, a data-driven systems approach has revolutionized
other high-risk practices, from trauma surgery to space travel. 6 The legal
profession is also beginning to embrace a data-driven pursuit of efficiency
and improvements. 7 Scholars have applied "Moneyball" inspired statistical
analysis to legal practice. 8 The innocence movement and law professors
such as Brandon Garrett have launched a number of studies designed to
reduce the errors that contribute to wrongful convictions. 9 However, there
has been no widespread effort to develop a data-driven approach to the
highly adversarial practice of public defense, in part because public defense
presents unique challenges for a data-driven systems approach. 10 In public
defense, positive outcomes are defined by client interests, rather than by
societal interests in accuracy or public safety. A wide range of causal
factors contributes to public defender outcomes; many of those factors are
5. In this regard, the state of public defense reflects a larger criminal litigation culture in which
"everyone in the system agrees that mistakes come from bad apples and that litigation at the end of this
process is well-designed to find them." Doyle, supra note 2, at 119. For further discussion of the
operator-error approach to improving outcomes, see infra Part II.A.
6. See infra Part II for a discussion of how various high-risk professions have adopted systems
approaches to optimize outcomes.
7. See infra Part !LC.I. See generally Joe Dysart, How Lawyers are Mining the Information
Mother Lode for Pricing, Practice Tips and Predictions, ABA J. (May I, 2013, 10:20 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_dawn_of_big_data/ (discussing how the legal
profession is taking on a more data-driven approach); Jennifer Smith, Should Lawyers Fear Big Data,
or Embrace It?, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2013, 6:24 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/09/24/shouldlawyers-fear-big-data-or-embrace-it/.
8. Wright & Peeples, supra note 2, at 1222-23 (discussing whether it is possible to apply the
Moneyball technique of looking to "statistical measures of [baseball] player quality" to criminal
defense).
9. See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS Go WRONG (2011) (discussing the various causes of wrongful convictions); Brandon L.
Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 58-59 (2008) (presenting "the results of an
empirical study that examines how our criminal system handled, from start to finish, the cases of the
first 200 persons exonerated by post-conviction DNA testing in the United States"); Brandon L. Garrett,
Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 401 (2007) ("Data available from a
comprehensive study of death penalty verdicts shows that both egregiously incompetent defense
counsel and prosecutorial suppression of evidence are frequent and persistent causes of capital
reversals.") [hereinafter Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law]; Jon B. Gould, Julia Carrano, Richard
Leo & Joseph Young, Predicting Erroneous Convictions: A Social Science Approach, NAT'L INST.
CORRECTIONS (Dec. 2012), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles l/nij/grants/241389.pdf.
10. Notably, however, some scholars have proposed "informal practice guidelines" to "improve
resource allocation" in public defense. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Defense Attorney Discretion to
Ration Services and Shortchange Some Clients, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 207, 215 (2004) (proposing and
advocating the use of informal practice guidelines).
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beyond defenders' knowledge or control. Nevertheless, we believe that
public defender organizations can modify the data-driven systems approach
to improve outcomes for poor people charged with crimes. This Article
explains how to develop the theory and practices necessary for the
successful collection and analysis of public defender data. 11
Part I describes the data deficit in public defense. A surfeit of data is
collected about public defender budgets and caseloads. 12 However, there
are no data systems that systematically collect and analyze the causal and
correlative relationships between defender practices and case outcomes.
Stories about defender errors-from pretrial investigation to post-trial
sentencing-pervade case law and legal scholarship. 13 Yet there is no
empirical evidence about the prevalence of these errors and the precautions
that might cure them. And while many external factors-from case facts to
prosecutorial policies-influence case outcomes, public defenders have no
empirical information about those influences and are therefore ill-equipped
to develop responsive practices. Part I also discusses the systemic,
technological, and cultural reasons for this public defense data void.
Resource constraints and technological limitations account for some of the
data gap. However, as Part I explains, the culture of public defense may
also substantially contribute to this data-less environment.
11. As former public defenders, we are aware of the daily pressures, frustrations, and
impossibilities of the public defender's job. Andrew Ferguson was a supervising attorney at the Public
Defender Service for the District of Columbia. Pamela Metzger was an associate attorney in the Federal
Defender Division of the Legal Aid Society of New York. We know that public defenders are
hardworking and under-appreciated professionals who face unrelenting challenges. Indeed, after
Hurricane Katrina, Professor Metzger sat on the board of New Orleans's Public Defender and ran a
data-driven project assessing the legal needs of defendants evacuated during Hurricane Katrina. And,
between 2009 and 2013, Professor Metzger served on the Louisiana Public Defender Board; her work
included the development of policies and practices for data collection and analysis. Adopting a systems
approach to public defense runs against our own training and sensibilities as public defense "artists."
However, other high-stakes professions, such as aviation and medicine, have dramatically improved
outcomes by implementing a data-driven "systems approach" to their work. We believe public
defenders can do the same.
12. These data, however, are often woefully inaccurate. In addition, lack of standardized data
measures or even a uniform terminology inhibits the relevance of the data for cross-jurisdictional
comparison.
13. See generally Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the
Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1109
(2004) (discussing pretrial errors); Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Dreaming of Effective Assistance: The
Awakening a/Cronic 's Call to Presume Prejudice from Representational Absence, 76 TEMP. L. REV.
827, 843 (2003) (discussing trial errors or failures); Sarah French Russell, Reluctance to Resentence:
Courts, Congress, and Collateral Review, 91 N.C. L. REV. 79, 89 (2012) (discussing sentencing errors);
Carissa Byrne Hessick, Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1069, 1080 (2009)
(discussing sentencing errors).
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Part II explains the systems approach to high-stakes activities and
explores how public defenders can adapt this approach to the delivery of
indigent defense services. The systems approach assumes the incidence of human error and looks to larger organizational systems for both cause and
cure. 14 A systems approach creates and maintains an ongoing system for
reporting and analyzing risks, errors, performances, and outcomes. Using
these data, the systems approach creates a feedback loop that highlights
risks, reduces errors, improves performances, and optimizes outcomes. 15
Part II explains how, using a data-driven systems approach, the fields of
aviation and medicine substantially improved their safety and efficiency.
However, as Part II demonstrates, there are significant differences between
public defense and the fields of aviation and medicine. These differences
require that a systems approach to public defense be modified to account
for the public defender's unique adversarial context and the multi-causal
nature of client outcomes.
Part III proposes a systems approach to public defense and, within the
context of the current data-less and data-resistant practice, offers a
preliminary typology of the data that such a system should collect and
analyze. Using concrete examples, the proposal set forth in Part III
highlights the importance of developing a data-driven systems approach to
public defense that can account for internal and external factors that
contribute to outcomes. Part III also emphasizes the importance of
developing a systems approach focused on outcomes rather than errors.
While a systems approach usually targets the organizational factors that
contribute to human error, we believe that a myopic focus on defender error
would overlook external causal factors, thereby depriving public defenders
of information critical to their ability to plan and execute strategies for
client representation. Moreover, a focus on defender error would preclude
learning from defender success, overlooking the striking accomplishments
of many public defenders who triumph over significant odds.
Keeping the unique defender mission in mind, Part III also addresses
the challenges to implementing a data-driven systems approach to public
defense. The image of the defender as a rebel, public servant, and hero runs
directly against a data-driven approach to defender practice. While
14. As discussed infra Part II.A, the systems approach should be contrasted with the "person
approach" to error, which is a characteristic of both the existing attorney disciplinary system and the
ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine. See infra notes 109-113 and accompanying text.
15. Teresa M. Schreffler, Systems Approaches to Improving the Quality of Healthcare:
Strengths, Weaknesses, and the Ideal Model of Medical Error Reporting, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 1249,
1263-64, 1277 (2005).
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acknowledging this special, motivating ethos of the public defender, Part
III questions the limitations of a self-identity that tolerates both brilliant
mistakes and ordinary errors with some frequency.
Part IV offers concrete contextual suggestions about how public
defender systems might implement a data-driven systems approach to
indigent defense. As Part IV explains, the impetus for data collection and
analysis must come from defenders themselves. Drawing on emerging
defender practices, and upon the successful implementation of the systems
approach in high-stakes industries such as aviation and healthcare, we offer
practical suggestions for implementing a data-driven systems approach to
outcome improvement in defender practice.
This Article concludes with a call to the indigent defense community
to establish national standards for data collection that can be implemented
across jurisdictions. Developing a shared vocabulary and framework for the
analysis of defender data will be an important first step in reimagining the
delivery of public defender services.
I. THE DAT A CRISIS IN PUBLIC DEFENSE

A. PUBLIC DEFENSE AS A DATA-LESS PRACTICE

In most areas of
defender system goes
Gideon v. Wainwright,
resources. 17 Defender

the country, the promise of a high-quality public
largely unfulfilled. 16 More than fifty years after
defenders still handle too many cases, with too few
training is inadequate, expert funding is limited,

16. Nat'l Right to Counsel Comm., Justice Denied: America's Continuing Neglect of Our
Constitutional
Right
to
Counsel,
THE
CONST.
PROJECT
1-15
(April
2009),
http://www.constitutionproject.org/manage/file/139.pdf; Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent
Defendants, Gideon's Broken Promise: America's Continuing Quest for Equal Justice: A Report on the
American Bar Association's Hearings on the Right to Counsel in Criminal Proceedings, AM. BAR
ASS'N
19
(Dec.
2004),
http://www.americanbar.org/gtoups/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/
initiatives/indigent_defense_systems_improvement/gideons_broken_ promise.html; AM. BAR ASS'N &
NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, GIDEON UNDONE: THE CRISIS IN INDIGENT DEFENSE
FUNDING (John Thomas Moran ed., Nov. 1982) (discussing the problems created by inadequate funding
for indigent defense).
17. See Tigran W. Eldred, Prescriptions for Ethical Blindness: Improving Advocacy for Indigent
Defendants in Criminal Cases, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 333, 336 (2013) ("The causes of these deep and
persistent problems in indigent defense are well known. Invariably, any discussion begins with the
underfunding of defense services and the excessive workloads that result. Simply put, lawyers with too
many cases and too few resources cannot provide adequate representation to their clients."); Eve
Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 682-83 (2007) ("Deficient trial attorney performance is pervasive in
criminal cases. An overwhelming majority of public defenders are catastrophically overworked.");
Heidi Reamer Anderson, Qualitative Assessments of Effective Assistance of Counsel, 51 WASHBURN
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investigations are poorly conducted, plea bargains are rushed, and "justice"
remains staggeringly imperfect. 18 There is wide variation in the quality of
public defense; defendants receive good or bad representation as a matter
of chance, depending on the individual lawyer assigned to represent them. 19
While defender offices differ in their level of quality and training,
poor people accused of crime generally enter a patchwork of underfunded
and understaffed public defense systems. 20 Almost everywhere, a relentless
funding crisis requires that defenders handle ever-increasing caseloads with
ever-dwindling resources. 21 And there are no solutions in sight. 22
L.J. 571, 571 (2012) ("Public defenders have labored under excessive caseloads for decades. These
excessive caseloads often prevent the affected lawyers from providing effective assistance of counsel to
their indigent clients."); Cara H. Drinan, The National Right to Counsel Act: A Congressional Solution
to the Nation's Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 HARV. J. LEGIS. 487, 491 (2010) [hereinafter Drinan,
National Right to Counsel Act] ("With persistent funding problems come a host of other conditions that
generate chronic and pervasive deprivations of the right to counsel. As a result of funding shortfalls,
defense lawyers must manage workloads so excessive that it is literally impossible for them to provide
effective representation to all (if any) of their clients."); Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent
Defense from a Legal Ethics Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169, 1169 (2003) ("[T]he under-funding of
indigent defense also raises a serious and inadequately recognized problem of professional ethics: the
systemic neglect of indigent defendants by their appointed lawyers."); Mary Sue Backus & Paul
Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1031-36
(2006) (profiling examples of overworked and underfunded public defense agencies).
18. Deborah Leff & Melanca Clark, Doing Justice to Gideon, HUM. RTS., Apr. 2013, at 7, 7
("That a crisis exists today in indigent defense is beyond dispute; poor people often do not have access
to counsel, and when they do get an attorney, that lawyer is often overworked, undertrained,
undercompensated, and placed in a system that encourages a quick plea bargain and discourages
carefully listening to the needs of clients."); Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense
Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 427, 430 (2009) [hereinafter Drinan, Third Generation]
("Without adequate funding, states and counties cannot provide the fundamental elements of an
effective, efficient, high-quality, and ethical public defense system."). See also id. at 429 ("In New
York, where counties select indigent defense lawyers on a low-bid, flat-fee basis, attorneys are regularly
assigned to cases with no regard for their level of training or experience, and the state provides no
supervision or monitoring of attorney performance.").
19. See Dick Thornburgh, A Vigorous and Capable Prosecution and Defense, 36 CHAMPION,
June 2012, at 57, 57 ("While many of the lawyers who defend the accused are talented and dedicated,
the quality of representation of criminal defendants is strikingly uneven and too often nowhere near that
provided those with the financial resources to engage their own counsel.").
20. See generally Alissa Pollitz Worden, Andrew Lucas Blaize Davies & Elizabeth K. Brown, A
Patchwork of Policies: Justice, Due Process and Public Defense Across American States, 74 ALB . L.
REV. 1423 (2011) (discussing the inconsistent and patchwork nature of indigent defense across
jurisdictions); Andrew Lucas Blaize Davies & Alissa Pollitz Worden, State Politics and the Right to
Counsel: A Comparative Analysis, 43 LAW & Soc'Y REV. I (2009) (analyzing the effect that state
funding has on indigent defense programs). See also Abe Krash, The Architects of the Gideon Decision:
Abe Fortas and Justice Hugo Black, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1191, 1203 (2014) ("Many public defender's
offices throughout the country are underfunded and understaffed. The budget crisis in many states has
aggravated the problem." (footnotes omitted)); Primus, supra note 17, at 686 ("Most public defenders
are incredibly overworked and severely underfunded.").
21. See, e.g., Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 222 (N.Y. 2010) (alleging that "the
absence of clear and uniform guidelines reasonably related to need has commonly resulted in denials of
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Amidst this persistent crisis, public defender systems rarely assess the
efficacy of defenders' legal work. Few accountability mechanisms track
attorney performance, and fewer still distinguish between competent and
deficient performances. Public defender data systems fail to connect case
"inputs" (investigations, motions, counseling, and advocacy) to case
"outcomes" (convictions, acquittals, pleas, and sentences). As a result,
public defender systems are largely data-less environments.
This information deficit means that public defenders have no
empirical evidence to guide them in prioritizing effective practices and
avoiding common errors. With rare exceptions, even the most passionate
and diligent public defender must make hard choices about how to deploy
her limited time and scarce resources. 23 Should she file a bond review
motion for today's client or an evidentiary motion for tomorrow's trial?
Should she draft a sentencing motion for a case she just lost or prepare a
representation to indigent defendants based on the subjective judgments of individual jurists"); Drinan,

National Right to Counsel Act, supra note 17, at 488 ("Despite voluminous empirical evidence and
scholarly research describing the national crisis in indigent defense services, this seemingly intractable
crisis persists."); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender
Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626, 2631 (2013) ("Indigent defense is in a state of crisis. Defender offices are
chronically underfunded, resulting in crushing caseloads. Most offices do not have caseload limits, and
those that do regularly surpass them."); Nat') Right to Counsel Comm., supra note 16, at 52 ("Although
funding has gone up, it is still woefully insufficient, and many of the same problems exist today, more
than four decades later."); Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, supra note 16, at iv
("[T]housands of persons are processed through America's courts every year either with no lawyer at all
or with a lawyer who does not have the time, resources, or in some cases the inclination to provide
effective representation.").
22. See, e.g., Paul Marcus, Why the United States Supreme Court Got Some (But Not a Lot) of
the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Analysis Right, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 142, 152 (2009) ("Study
after study, review upon review, report after report, make certain-with virtually no dissent-that the
hope of providing capable lawyers to all poor defendants in criminal cases is not being realized. In spite
of enormous sums of money being spent throughout the United States on tremendous numbers of cases,
the system of providing counsel across much of our nation is, in a word, broken."); Robert P. Mosteller,
The Sixth Amendment Rights to Fairness: The Touchstones of Effectiveness and Pragmatism, 45 TEX.
TECH L. REV. I, 4 (2012) [hereinafter Mosteller, Sixth Amendment] ("Neither the inadequate provision
of resources to the defense nor the relative infrequency of trials is likely to change for the better any
time soon .... [I]f anything, they are likely to get worse as the need for long-run deficit reduction
systemically restricts the resources available to state and local governments .... "); Stephen B. Bright,
Legal Representation for the Poor: Can Society Afford This Much Injustice?, 75 MO. L. REV. 683
(2010); Backus & Marcus, supra note 17, at 1045; Robert P. Mosteller, Protecting the Innocent: Part of
the Solution for Inadequate Funding for Defenders, Not a Panacea for Targeting Justice, 75 MO. L.
REV. 931, 954-57 (2010) [hereinafter Mosteller, Protecting the Innocent; Benjamin H. Barton &
Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L.
REV. 967, 972-77 (2012).
23. See, e.g., Kim Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v. Institutional Player: Alternating
Visions of the Public Defender, 84 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2434 (1996) ("Limited funds necessitated choosing
cases and issues to which resources would be devoted or from which they would be denied. The
competing needs of clients required considering factors beyond those arising in individual cases.").
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witness for a case she might win? 24
Public defender offices as a whole face the same hard choices. Should
they spend more money training their attorneys or hiring additional
supervisors? Should they prioritize pretrial motions practice over
sentencing litigation? Lacking systemic data, defenders cannot distinguish
between those practices that produce adverse client outcomes and those
that produce optimal client outcomes. Without this data, public defender
offices lack empirical mechanisms to identify how to optimize attorney
performance, improve client outcomes, and maximize scarce defender
resources. 25 In short, defenders do not know what they do not know; all
they know for certain is that the system is failing poor people accused of
crime. 26
There is a burgeoning effort to develop data about public defense. 27
However, public defense is a high-volume practice with a low incidence of
case review. 28 Most of the available public defender data tracks caseloads
and budgets, rather than defender performance and case outcomes. 29 And,
24. See generally Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument
from Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 816 (2004) ("[If] far-less-than-ideal resources are
all we can reasonably expect for now; how should lawyers distribute them?").
25. See Wright & Peeples, supra note 2, at 1229-30 ("While individual attorney evaluations are
important within public defender organizations, the current basis for these evaluations is anecdotal and
intuitive .... Managers in public defense organizations do evaluate individual attorneys, but they
typically do not rely on quantitative measures. When it comes to quantitative measures, these managers
more often use data to evaluate defender offices as a whole, rather than relying on statistics to inform
their assessment of particular staff attorneys."). See also Brown, supra note 10, at 217. Professor Brown
notes that "[ t]rial lawyers often lack information that is important to executing a policy of services
allocation." Id. He urges criminal defense attorneys to prioritize the representation of innocent
defendants and encourages attorneys to rely on "the large and growing literature on the sources of
wrongful convictions and of erroneous trial information generally." Id. at 218. For reasons discussed
infra notes 177-180, we believe that the wrongful conviction dataset is inadequate to this task.
26. Eric H. Holder, Jr., 18th Annual Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Lecture: University of the District of
Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law, 14 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 3, 6 (2011) ("Our indigent defense
system ... is broken; public defenders in some areas are so overwhelmed that they can spend, at most,
an hour per case, many of which present life-altering legal questions and decisions.").
27. See infra Part III.C.3.
28. The reasons for the lack of review are complex. One structural reality is that plea bargaining
resolves over 95 percent of criminal cases, which limits the ability of courts to review criminal cases.
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012). In addition, resource limitations in defender officers
impede the ability to institute robust internal reviews by supervisors. Finally, few external auditing
organizations exist to investigate whether defender services are providing optimal legal services. As
will be discussed throughout this Article, our systems approach attempts to address each of these
problems.
29. See ERINN HERBERMAN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE GOVERNMENT INDIGENT DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, FY 2008-2012UPDATED (Apr. 2015), http://www.bjs.gov/contentlpub/pdf/sgide0812.pdf ("In 2012, state governments
spent 2.2 billion nationally on indigent defense.").
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while hundreds of scholarly articles have examined the crisis of indigent
defense, 30 there is limited empirical data about its daily practice.
For example, we know that "the Minnesota state legislature reduced
the public defense budget for the 2009 fiscal year by four million dollars,
thereby forcing the layoff of twenty-three public defenders. As a result of
these layoffs, public defenders in Minnesota are now expected to manage a
caseload of an estimated 550 felony cases per year, instead of the 450
felonies per year that each attorney managed prior to the cuts."31 However,
we do not know what legal advocacy was done in any of those 550 felony
cases. Nor do we know how Minnesota public defenders should shift their
lawyering priorities to effectively handle their increased felony caseloads.
Intuitively, lawyers, judges, and scholars surmise that high caseloads are a
key structural factor in defender errors. However, "[t]he quality of data
available for any given criminal case is shallow and appalling, even though
the sheer number of cases is impressive. " 32
Within this overworked and underfunded system, there are no data to
suggest how defenders can maximize their scarce resources while
improving client outcomes. 33 Defenders lack any empirical knowledge
about what they should be doing; indeed, defenders often lack any
empirical knowledge about what they are doing. The collection and
analysis of data about defender practices and case outcomes can provide
essential tools to remedy this knowledge gap.
Even the most egregious lawyering failures are not catalogued in any
structured, analyzable manner. 34 We may know that a lawyer failed to
properly inform a client of a plea, 35 but not whether, or how often, that
failure has been repeated in other cases across the system. We may know
that a lawyer failed to investigate a case, 36 but not whether this omission
30. See sources cited supra notes 20-22.
31. Drinan, National Right to Counsel Act, supra note 17, at 491.
32. Wright & Peeples, supra note 2, at 1233.
33. As noted infra notes 176-179 and accompanying text, the limited data identifying causal
factors in wrongful convictions are inadequate for the task of improving case outcomes across the larger
public defender system. Some scholars have attempted to use anecdotal evidence to identify and assess
practices that might improve case outcomes. However, it has been difficult to develop empirical support
for their claims.
34. See sources cited supra note 25.
35. See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1403 (2012) (holding that defense counsel's
failure to inform the defendant of the prosecution's plea offer constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1391 (2012) (holding that defense counsel's
mischaracterization of the prosecution's plea offer constituted ineffective assistance of counsel).
36. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 512 (2003) (holding that defense counsel's failure to
investigate stemmed from "inattention" and was thus unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
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was isolated or systemic. 37
Improving client outcomes requires information. Public defender
systems need to know what their lawyers do and how their lawyers'
decisions affect client outcomes. The next section considers some of the
obstacles to collecting this data.
B. THE CHALLENGES TO DEVELOPING DATA ABOUT PUBLIC DEFENSE

1. The Absence of Structural Incentives
Public defender organizations operate without significant legal,
financial, or political pressure to develop qualitative data about public
defender practices and outcomes. In contrast, industries that have robust
practices of data collection and analysis developed those practices in part as
a response to legal, financial, and political pressures. 38 The aviation and
healthcare industries operate under strong structural incentives for risk
minimization, error reduction, and outcome improvement. The threat of
government regulation and the possibility of costly lawsuits (and the
corresponding increase in insurance premiums) drive many risk
management practices that might otherwise be considered too expensive. 39
363 (2000) (holding that trial lawyer's failure to investigate mitigating evidence was ineffective
assistance of counsel).
37. See Wright & Peeples, supra note 2, at 1229-30 (pointing out that known information about
public defending is usually anecdotal); Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, supra note 9, at 402
("[T]hough ineffective assistance claims are typically raised only in individual cases, indigent defense
is provided by local government, and thus gross deficiencies would be likely across entire localities and
states if the statutory funding scheme was deficient. Indeed, data from national studies documenting and
analyzing ineffective and under-funded indigent defense counsel shows precisely such systemic
ineffectiveness.").
38. See infra notes 93-106 and accompanying text (describing how public concerns over
industrial and transportation safety sparked research into organizational error management).
39. See David M. Gaba, Anesthesiology as a Model for Patient Safety in Health Care, 320 BRIT.
MED. J. 785, 785 (2000) (citing the soaring cost of malpractice insurance for anesthesiologists in the
United States as a causal factor in that field's data-driven approach to safety); Victor Barley et al.,
Letter: Defensive Culture ofBritish Medicine Needs to Change, 321 BRIT. MED. J. 505, 505 (2000) ("In
the United States the insurance industry provided the impetus for the study of adverse events .... ");
Robert L. Helmreich, On Error Management: Lessons from Aviation, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 781, 781
(2000) ("When error is suspected, litigation and new regulations are threats in both medicine and
aviation."); Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized
Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I, 324 N. ENG. J. MED. 370, 370 (1991) ("This
increase [in malpractice claims brought against health providers] has precipitated numerous state
programs designed to moderate the number of claims and encourage providers to develop quality-ofcare initiatives."). But see Saul N. Weingart et al., Epidemiology of Medical Error, 320 BRIT. MED. J.
774, 775 (2000) ("Data on [medical] risk management also underestimate medical error ... because
there is little association between malpractice claims and medical error."). Standing alone, concerns
about liability, litigation and insurance might serve as disincentives for the candid reporting necessary
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The same is not true for indigent defense. Despite class action lawsuits
and government reports bemoaning the problems of public defense, there is
no strong political will in favor of increasing funding or legal reform. Trial
judges rarely intervene to identify and address ineffective assistance of
counsel. 4 For obvious reasons, prosecutors usually withhold criticism. 41

°

The constitutional standard of Strickland v. Washington renders most
ineffective assistance of counsel challenges unsuccessful vehicles for
developing data about the delivery of public defender services for at least
four reasons. 42 First, Strickland requires prejudice; this means that
substandard lawyering without prejudice is not recorded as a constitutional
violation. 43 Courts routinely engage in the prejudice inquiry first and then,
having determined that there was no prejudice, decline even to explore the
question of attorney performance. As a result, Strickland case law has
failed to develop any significant data about the relationship between public
defender practices and case outcomes. Second, Strickland presumes
attorney effectiveness based on an amorphous (data-less) standard of
reasonableness. 44 Strickland opinions rarely assess or prescribe
to a successful data-driven systems approach. Paul Barach & Stephen Small, Reporting and Preventing
Medical Mishaps: Lessons from Non-Medical Near Miss Reporting Systems, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 759,
759 (2000); Leo Strunin, Maldwyn Morgan & Paul Cartwright, Rapid Response: Differences Between
Anaesthesia and Anaesthesiology, BRIT. MED. J. (Mar. 18, 2000), http://www.bmj.com/rapidresponse/2011/10/28/differences-between-anaesthesia-and-anesthesiology ("The imperative for change
in attitude to safety in the United States was severe medico-legal pressures."). However, as discussed
infra Part II, a successful systems approach accounts for, and changes, those disincentives.
40. But see Jay William Burnett & Catherine Greene Burnett, Ethical Dilemmas Confronting a
Felony Trial Judge: To Remove or Not to Remove Deficient Counsel, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1315, 1316
(2000) ("The judge in the American criminal trial process has an obligation to depart from traditional
paradigms of judging and directly intervene when confronted with egregious defense counsel
deficiencies. While the scope of that intervention may take various forms, ranging from an ex parte
inquiry to the questioning of witnesses or removal of counsel, the nature of the judge's duty remains
constant: to accept responsibility for the proper functioning of our legal system.").
41. Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
355, 394 (2001) ("(W]hy have I never encountered-<>r even heard of-a single prosecutor who has
come forward to halt a trial in the face of plainly incompetent defense counsel?"); Vanessa Merton,
What Do You Do When You Meet a "Walking Violation of the Sixth Amendment" if You're Trying to
Put that Lawyer's Client in Jail?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 997, 1004 (2000); Fred C. Zacharias,
Structuring the Ethics ofProsecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV.
45, 66-74 (1991).
42. Primus, supra note 17, at 680-81 ("[T]here is no effective remedy for defendants whose
attorneys are constitutionally deficient at trial. Most defendants are unable to challenge their trial
attorneys' performance on direct appeal. Rather, they must first complete their appeals-a process that
often takes four years or more-before they can present ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in
collateral review proceedings. By that time, most convicted defendants have served their full sentences,
giving them little incentive to pursue further challenges." (footnotes omitted)).
43. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
44. Id. at 689 ("A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to
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performance norms, much less develop performance and outcome data.
Third, Strickland focuses on individual cases, treating attorney failure as
the rare exception, and excuses error caused by systemic constraints (such
as underfunding and overwork) that may prevent public defenders from
doing what better-resourced attorneys would do under similar
circumstances. 45 Finally, most jurisdictions require defendants to litigate
ineffective assistance claims on collateral review, introducing assessment
and accountability measures too late to provide an effective remedy. 46 This
lag time between lawyering performance, case outcomes, and judicial
review means that any Strickland-generated data are hopelessly out of date.
When Strickland fails even to police bad lawyering, how can it hope to
generate significant data about its occurrence and impact? 47
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged
conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties
inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.").
45. See generally Anderson, supra note 17, at 578 (discussing Strickland's focus on individual
cases).
46. See Eve Brensike Primus, The Illusory Right to Counsel, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 597, 607
(2011) ("A majority of jurisdictions encourage criminal defendants to wait until state post-conviction
review to raise claims of trial or appellate attorney ineffectiveness.").
47. See Meredith J. Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense Attorneys: A System
in Need of Reform, 2002 BYU L. REV. I, 19 (2002) ("First, the Strickland court encourages reviewing
courts not to speak of incompetent legal representation in many situations, thereby eliminating an
opportunity for courts to discuss and put defense lawyers on notice regarding unacceptable lawyering
activities. Second, the Court set in place strong presumptions that unnecessarily favor poor lawyering
conduct. Further, as a result of Strickland, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is essentially
rendered a viable claim available only to the truly innocent criminal defendant. Finally, a Strickland
challenge requires the cooperation of the attorney about whom the petitioner complains. Any one of
these reasons individually makes bringing a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim-even
where one received deplorable legal assistance-an arduous task. Taken together, they make Strickland
challenges exceedingly difficult to win." (footnotes omitted)); William J. Stuntz, The Political
Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 824 (2006) ("The Justices do not know which
defense attorney tactics are most likely to produce defense victories, and which ones are bound to lead
to defeat. Probably no one knows, since the answers depend on context, and (not incidentally) on the
identity of defense counsel. To the extent that ineffective assistance doctrine requires such judgments,
the Justices cannot do what their own doctrine requires." (footnote omitted)); Laurence A. Benner,
When Excessive Public Defender Workloads Violate the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Without a
Showing of Prejudice, AM. CONST. SOC'Y FOR L. & POL'Y 2 (Mar. I, 2011),
https://www.acslaw.org/files/BennerIB _ExcessivePD _ Workloads.pdf
("Demonstrating
prejudice
because of an excessive caseload is thus problematic. Even if counsel conducted little or no
investigation due to an excessive caseload, for example, how does one determine, sometimes years after
the event, what a prompt and thorough investigation would have uncovered? Moreover, if favorable
evidence is later uncovered, it is often, as one judge candidly admitted, 'impossible to know' in a postconviction proceeding what effect the evidence would have had on the jury. Attempting systemic
reform through post-conviction ineffective assistance of counsel claims is thus not an effective
option.").
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Outside institutions such as bar counsel and ethics panels have
remained vigilant, but rather toothless in identifying substandard
performance. 48 Civil lawsuits and legislative advocacy have spurred reform
in some jurisdictions, but the national question of how to create an
accountability mechanism to reduce practitioner error has not been
answered. 49
Finally, malpractice claims against defenders offer little opportunity to
collect data. First, in some jurisdictions, malpractice claims against public
defenders are barred by statutory immunity. 50 Even in the state courts that
allow such suits, 51 defendants rarely recover damages. 52 Further, the
Supreme Court has disallowed Section 1983 federal civil rights claims
against defenders, 53 although federal defenders can still face state
malpractice suits. 54 But even with a cause of action, any such civil claims
48. See, e.g., Michael S. Frisch, No Stone Left Unturned: The Failure ofAttorney Self-Regulation
in the District of Columbia, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 325, 326 (2005) ("Unfortunately, the volunteer
system [to consider ethical violations] has not worked. Cases are kept alive and pending for years.");
Jenna C. Newmark, The Lawyer's "Prisoner's Dilemma": Duty and Self-Defense in Postconviction
Ineffectiveness Claims, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 699, 731 (2010) ("(W]hile some states require that all
findings on ineffective assistance of counsel be reported to the state ethics board, lawyers are rarely
disciplined for being ineffective."); Anne M . Voigts, Narrowing the Eye of the Needle: Procedural
Default, Habeas Reform, and Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1103,
1125-26 (1999) ("(I]neffective or incompetent counsel may have little to fear from state ethics
boards.").
49. See Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N .E.2d 217 (N.Y. 2010). But see Drinan, Third Generation,
supra note 18, at 440.
SO. Vincent R. Johnson, Legal Malpractice in a Changing Profession: The Role of Contract
Principles, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 489, 492 n.12 (2013). See, e.g., Osborne v. Goodlett, No. M200303118-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 1713868, at •3 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 22, 2005) (dismissing a legal
malpractice action against a public defender in Tennessee because of statutory immunity); Thorp v.
Strigari, 800 N.E.2d 392, 398 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (denying a malpractice claim in Ohio because of
immunity provided by statute); Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 773 (Minn. 1993) (holding that
public defenders are immune from suit in Minnesota). But see Coronado Police Officers Ass'n v.
Carroll, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 553, 564 (Ct. App. 2003) (denying public defenders immunity from
malpractice claims in California).
51. John P. Taddei, Beyond Absolute Immunity: Alternative Protections for Prosecutors Against
Ultimate Liability for§ 1983 Suits, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1883, 1919 (2012). See also id. at 1919 n.252
(citing a number of state court cases discussing the immunity issue).
52. See Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: Co/lateral Consequences, Silence, and
Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 164 (2009) (recognizing that
malpractice claims against public defenders are rarely successful); Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel: The Case/or an Ex Ante Parity Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242,
285 (1997) ("(B)y imposing significant costs on indigent defense lawyers (whether through insurance
payments or the risk of adverse judgments), tort liability would only exacerbate the underlying resource
deficiency. The courts understandably have given malpractice suits against public defenders a chilly
reception.").
53. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).
54. Roberts, supra note 52, at 166 n.192 (citing Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 205 (1979)).

2015]

DEFENDING DATA

1073

generally require a lawyer and the money and wherewithal to bring the
lawsuit. As clients of public defenders are indigent-and many
incarcerated-access to civil legal counsel is rare. The result is that legal
malpractice claims expose only a small fraction of the professional
malpractice that may be occurring.
2. Definitional and Operational Challenges
The practice of criminal defense does not intuitively lend itself to easy
ordering, structuring, or categorization. 55 Criminal cases vary greatly
according to the charged offense and to defendant characteristics.
Moreover, public defenders generally do not specialize in particular types
of cases or clients. 56 Accordingly, there is very little systematization in how
lawyers handle criminal cases. Creating a data collection system that
monitors public defense inputs and outcomes would require definitional
clarity about what data to collect and the operational capacity required to
collect them.
In aviation and medicine, data about the "techniques" of practice are
collected pursuant to a vocabulary that is standardized across a wide range
of geographical and legal boundaries. 57 There are normative expectations
about best practices, such as what constitutes a safe landing approach and
what dosages of medication are appropriate for a patient's weight and age.
Key components of professional practice are standardized and given a
common vocabulary. 58
The Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"), which regulates all
aviation in the United States, has created national standards for professional
"practice." Using these national standards, the FAA maintains several
databases that track aviation outcomes with a data-language common to all
pilots. 59 Similarly, the American Medical Association ("AMA"), which
55. Worden, Davies & Brown, supra note 20, at 1463 ("[T]he stereotypical model of public
defense representation-that typologized by Gideon-may not capture the challenges of representing a
more diverse group of defendants, against a wider and more complex range of charges .... ").
56. While capital and juvenile cases are notable exceptions to this observation, even the most
specialized defenders recognize that every case is different.
57. However, medicine has "no standardised method of investigation, documentation, and
dissemination" of information about accidents. Helmreich, supra note 39, at 781. Accord Weingart et
al., supra note 39, at 776 ("Comparing studies is difficult because research methods are not
standardised.").
58. The Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") serves as the national accrediting and
regulating organization for pilots. To a lesser extent, the American Medical Association ("AMA")
regulates doctors. However, doctors, like lawyers, are licensed by state accrediting boards.
59. FAA Operations and Performance Data, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., http://asprnhelp.faa.gov/
(last modified Mar. 6, 2015).
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plays a powerful role in standardizing medical education and patient
treatment, 60 promulgates the Current Procedural Terminology ("CPT")
codes. These CPT codes are the lingua franca of medical practice: they
provide a "uniform language that accurately describes medical, surgical,
and diagnostic services, and thereby serves as an effective means for
reliable nationwide communication among physicians and other healthcare
providers, patients, and third parties. " 61
In contrast, the systemic and regional differences between defenders
in different jurisdictions have thwarted the development of a common datalanguage for public defender practice. Defender systems are different in
every state and county in the country. 62 Some defender systems provide
"horizontal" representation, some "vertical," some "holistic. " 63 Some
indigent defense systems are staffed by full time lawyers, others by parttime attorneys, still others by contractually assigned counsel. 64 These
highly diverse practice structures complicate efforts to generate data that
speaks to the national community of public defenders and their clients. 65
Moreover, because there is no universal structure for the delivery of
public defense services, there is no consensus about what data public
defenders should collect and how they should collect them. From state to
state, the administrative bodies responsible for overseeing the defender
systems are markedly different. 66 Key legal terminology varies across
60. For example, the AMA runs the Physician Consortium for Performance Improvement, a
"national, physician-led program dedicated to enhancing quality and patient safety." Physician
Consortium for Performance Improvement, AM. MED. ASS ' N, https://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/
physician-resources/physician-consortium-performance-improvement.page (last visited June 29, 2015).
61. CPT Process-How a Code Becomes a Code, AM. MED. ASS'N, http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/solutions-managing-your-practice/coding-billinginsurance/cpt/cpt-process-faq/code-becomes-cpt.page (last visited June 29, 2015).
62. See Robert E. Stein, Public Defenders, HUM. RTS., April 2013, at 26, 26 ("According to data
collected by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) in 2007, in forty-nine states and the District of
Columbia, there are twenty-seven county and hybrid states with 763 individual offices and twenty-two
states with 483 local offices that have a central state-based public defender office.").
63. Anne Bowen Poulin, Strengthening the Criminal Defendant 's Right to Counsel, 28 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1213, 1254-55 (2006) (describing horizontal and vertical representation); Brooks Holland,
Holistic Advocacy: An Important but Limited Institutional Role, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
637 (2006) (describing holistic advocacy).
64. Randolph N . Stone, The Role of State Funded Programs in Legal Representation of Indigent
Defendants in Criminal Cases, 17 AM. J. TRJAL ADVOC. 205, 209-10 (1993).
65. See Worden, Davies & Brown, supra note 20, at 1424 ("As a result, public defense remains a
low-visibility, decentralized, and highly variable element of state court operations.").
66. As Phyllis Mann describes:
The administration of public defense services varies by jurisdiction and may be carried out by
a state, a county, a city, an individual judge, or by every possible combination of these.
Eighteen states have statewide commissions overseeing statewide public defense systems that
are theoretically responsible for all public defense services within each state. Two states have
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jurisdictions and practices can vary from court to court and judge to judge.
This diversity hinders any effort to develop indigent defense data that can
inform practice across jurisdictions. Without a national regulatory body,
any data collection mandate must emerge from each state or locality. 67
3. The Technological Challenges to Data Collection
Technological limitations remain an obvious impediment to the
development of data about public defense. Aviation and healthcare
professionals depend heavily upon technology. Indeed, technological
devices are often considered "members" of aviation and healthcare teams. 68
This technology serves the profession while simultaneously recording data
about professional practice and outcomes. This technology may provide
real-time warnings about significant risks or about unanticipated changes in
expected circumstances and outcomes. For example, an alert might signal
an impending storm, or technology might be used to measure the strength
of a metal airplane wing. Data protocols in both industries capture these
technological moments.
By comparison, public defenders are impoverished in their access to
technology. Many defender organizations operate in a constant state of
crisis. They do not have the technological resources to capture basic
information or adopt data-driven lawyering systems. They lack computers,
let alone secure networks or the personnel to update and troubleshoot
issues. For the poorest of defender systems, obtaining functioning
computers, copiers, and phones remains a priority. 69 Sophisticated
elected public defenders for each county or jurisdiction, who are directly accountable to the
voters. Eight states have a state public defender operating the public defense system
throughout the state, but the chief executive of the state public defender office is appointed by
and serves at the pleasure of the governor without any public defense commission to insulate
the provision of counsel to the poor from politics. Eleven states fall into a hybrid category. In
the remaining eleven states, the individual counties and/or cities control the administration of
trial-level indigent defense services, and there is no state oversight.
Phyllis E. Mann, Ethical Obligations of Indigent Defense Attorneys to Their Clients, 75 Mo. L. REV.
715, 716-23 (2010).
67. As discussed infra Part III.C.3, some pioneering indigent defense offices are experimenting
with this process. See, e.g., Margaret A. Gressens & Daryl V. Atkinson, The Challenge: Evaluating
Indigent
Defense,
N.C.
OFF.
INDIGENT
DEF.
SERV.
1
(June
2009),
http://www.ncids.org/Systems%20Evaluation%20Project/News_Updates_Products/N&U%20Links.htm
(under "Prior Publications").
68. John Amoore & Paula Ingram, Learning from Adverse Incidents Involving Medical Devices,
325 BRIT. MED. J. 272, 272 (2002) (quoting To ERR IS HUMAN. BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 62
(Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 1999)).
69. See, e.g., Backus & Marcus, supra note 17, at 1101 ("When the public defenders in Lake
County, Montana need to do legal research, without the funds to subscribe to online legal research
resources, they must drive seventy miles to the University of Montana Law School library. In
Montgomery County, Ohio, the lack of basic equipment was so dire that some defenders resorted to
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technology, integrated data systems, and big data analytics simply do not
enter into their calculus for discretionary spending.
Many public defenders lack access to even the most basic case
management systems, so they have no systemic technological support for
managing crucial deadlines. Offices that do have case management
software may not have-or may not know how to access-real-time data
about defender caseloads or how to alert managers about "dangerous
conditions," such as untenable workloads.
Among better-funded organizations, data collection competes with
other lawyering, training, and administrative priorities. Defender offices
that are focused on client services may spend additional funds on hiring
new lawyers or paying for existing support operations, rather than on new
technology. 70 When overworked defenders already spend too little time
with their clients, they may be reluctant to "waste" precious time on data
collection. 71 Resource concerns similarly overwhelm the administrators
who might otherwise be tasked with much of the data collection.
Even in offices that have embraced evolving technology, individual
lawyers' tactical decisions, client conversations, investigative insights, and
case strategies are rarely recorded. 72 While lawyers may use mental
checklists to organize a case, many of their important decisions are not
recorded as such in their case files. When detailed case files do exist, they
are rarely digitized, networked, or analyzed in comparison to other cases
and outcomes. As Ronald Wright and Ralph Peeples concluded after
examining the limited data about criminal defense lawyers:
Given this data environment, it would be especially challenging to learn
in detail about a criminal defense lawyer's work based on court or office
records. Much of the recorded information is only captured on paper,
with surprisingly little of it transferred to electronic format. The
bringing their personal computers to the office to prepare motions and memoranda.").
70. See, e.g., id. at 1102 ("In Connecticut, for instance, while the Division of Public Defender
Services dedicated its resources to replacing outdated computer equipment and continuing to provide
computerized legal research and case tracking information for its attorneys, the Chief State's Attorney's
Office established a special unit to educate prosecutors on the latest multimedia courtroom presentation
techniques.").
71. While lawyers who embrace new technology might be willing to do data entry throughout the
course of their workday, they may be unable to bring their laptops (or iPads) into courthouses or jails.
72. Perhaps more accurately, they are not recorded in any place accessible for analysis. There are
no doubt an abundance of lawyers' comments on sticky notes or yellow pads, but those are not easily
subject to a data-driven systems analysis.
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information that does make it into electronic format lands in separate
data systems that do not communicate with each other. 73

Most of the case management systems designed specifically for public
defense lawyers involve active data processes that require lawyers to
manually input case information. These systems are both time-consuming
and error-prone. When lawyers bear primary responsibility for the active
documentation of their work, the integrity of the data collection system
depends upon the integrity of attorney input. Active data systems also do
not correct errors or omissions; they merely record them. Moreover, many
of these programs are too rudimentary to record all the inputs and outcomes
necessary to develop a data-driven systems approach to public defense. 74
And, even if sufficiently sophisticated data collection processes existed,
problems would remain in their application, with recent budget shortfalls
only exacerbating the difficulty of implementing and maintaining defender
technologies. 75
4. A Data-Resistant Defender Culture
Defender culture also resists data innovation. Many defenders
instinctively reject the idea of a data-driven systems approach to practice.
Each case feels unique, each client is different, and each tactical decision
reflects a myriad of idiosyncratic factors. Reducing a deeply human, highly
particularized practice to a series of data points is an unappealing deviation
from the client-centered ethos that motivates many defenders. This section
briefly discusses the significant cultural challenges of adopting a datadriven approach to defending.
As a general matter, public defenders are anti-authoritarian-both
toward "the state" and toward their bosses. 76 As lawyers, they have chosen
73. Wright & Peeples, supra note 2, at 1232~33 (footnotes omitted).
74. See Beeman, Using Data, supra note 2, at 7 ("Public defender CMS [case management
software] software programs have improved considerably over the years. JustWare, developed by New
Dawn Technologies, and defenderData®, developed by JusticeWorks, are two examples of CMS
programs that have proven to be customizable and responsive to the types of reports that defender
agencies need to produce to effectively administer their offices.").
75. See Hard Times and the Right to Counsel, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/l l/21/opinion/21 fri2.html ("With state revenues in free fall, the problem
is reaching crisis proportions and creating a legal and moral challenge for the criminal justice system,
state legislatures and the legal profession. Statewide public defenders in Kentucky and Minnesota and
in cities such as Miami and Atlanta have been forced by budget cuts to fire or furlough lawyers.").
76. Robin Steinberg & David Feige, Cultural Revolution: Transforming the Public Defender's
Office, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 123, 132 (2004) ("Let's face it. Public defenders are
notoriously anti-authoritarian. It is one characteristic that makes them brave and great in a courtroom
when faced with a tough judge, prosecutor, or cop. But that trait makes it difficult for defender
managers alone to persuade staff that change is necessary and desirable.").
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the chaos of criminal court over the relative predictability of civil or
corporate practice. 77 As defenders, their constitutional and ethical role is to
stand in opposition to the govemment. 78 Such a professional posture
attracts rule-benders, iconoclasts, and revolutionary spirits, all of whom
generally resist being beholden to a data-driven order. As Abbe Smith has
eloquently explained, "The defender typecast is anti-authoritarian, feisty,
nonconformist, irreverent, skeptical, slightly voyeuristic, slightly
exhibitionist, and resilient." 79
Whatever their "type," defenders practice on the borderline of
contested moral, legal, and human dramas. This highly complex experience
of the world may make defenders reluctant to look for binary or reductive
practice norms. After all, their legal world is "gray," "the truth" is only
what can be proven in court, and there are always at least two sides to any
story. Within this world of contingent truth and uncertain futures, defenders
view "outcomes" as highly unpredictable. A trial, a plea, or a life may
depend upon inspired moments of genius or on random strokes of luck, but
certainly cannot be predicted by metrics or checklists.
This atomistic and individualistic view of lawyering means that
defenders rarely see themselves as part of any system-even a system of
public defenders. Although most defenders handle the same types of cases,
in the same courts, with the same law, using the same methods, defenders
do not see a larger defender system at work. By oath and ethics, defenders
devote themselves to one client above all other considerations. 80 As a
result, defenders tend to view systemic data as unnecessary and errors as
anomalous occurrences that occur in individual cases; they do not see
errors as institutional failures that affect multiple clients in broad and often
undiscovered ways.
Internal management structures contribute to this lack of focus on
systemic data. Historically, resource constraints have prevented supervisors
77. See MICHAEL SCOIT WEISS, PUBLIC DEFENDERS: PRAGMATIC AND POLITICAL
MOTIVATIONS TO REPRESENT THE INDIGENT 88, 151 (2005) (interviewing public defenders about their
motivations).
78. Charles K. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public
Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1254 (1993) ("Systemic justifications of zealous advocacy are
premised on the underlying structure of the adversary system.").
79. Abbe Smith, Too Much Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short Life and Fractured Ego of
the Empathic, Heroic Public Defender, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1203, 1217 (2004) [hereinafter Smith,
Too Much Heart] (footnotes omitted). Smith notes, however-and we concur-that "some defenders,
including career defenders, may be contrary to type." Id.
80. Of course, each defender represents hundreds of clients (often at once) and is, in reality,
constantly juggling the competing needs of these clients.
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from maintaining intensive oversight of defenders' daily practice. And
even in defender offices that provide significant supervisory support, most
lawyers work autonomously. Unlike attorneys in private practice, defenders
do not bill their time in six-minute increments, and they generally have
complete control over their relative allocation of time across their
individual caseloads. Defenders rely on their own professional judgment to
represent clients; there is rarely any assessment of whether defenders
allocate their time wisely or make the most outcome-optimizing decisions.
Even defender offices with the luxury of full time supervisors focus on
developing trial skills or enhancing sentencing advocacy, rather than
creating systemic data that can improve case outcomes for larger numbers
of clients. Developing and implementing data-driven performance
enhancements requires a different sort of oversight and analysis.
Moreover, certain defender offices may be simply resistant to change
because change is different and hard. 81 Like all lawyers, defenders get used
to practicing a certain way; they assume certain professional freedoms and
take certain calculated liberties. Defenders often meet innovations-datadriven or not-with resistance, and this resistance is often top-down. 82
Even those defenders who relish innovation may not embrace the
practical reality of data collection. Public defenders typically-and
accurately-view themselves as overburdened by bureaucratic minutiae
that interfere with client representation. The hassle of any additional work,
even if time or technology allows, may be unappealing. Any lawyer who
has tried to remember what she did in a day, for each client, at what time,
and for how long, knows that recording this information is the least
rewarding aspect of practice.
Naturally, defenders also worry that a structured system that collects
81. See Jonathan A. Rapping, Directing the Winds of Change: Using Organizational Culture to
Reform Indigent Defense, 9 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 177, 181 (2008) ("Culture plays a critical role in
defining every public defender system in need of reform."); William H. Simon, Where Is the "Quality
Movement" in Law Practice?, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 387, 402-03 (2012).
82. Jonathan A. Rapping, You Can't Build on Shaky Ground: Laying the Foundation for Indigent
Defense Reform Through Values-Based Recruitment, Training, and Mentoring, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y
REV. 161, 173-74 (2009) ("[T]here is far more resistance to learning new approaches from seasoned
practitioners than from newer lawyers. A common refrain is, 'I have been doing it this way for thirty
years,' implying an unwillingness to change."). As defender organizations discovered when adopting
more holistic practices, public defenders may be reluctant to try new approaches, even when those
approaches increase defender resources. See Steinberg & Feige, supra note 76, at 123-24 ("The
traditional defender office is lawyer-driven and case-oriented. The culture centers on a small cadre of
trial lawyers esteemed for their trial skills. The obsessive focus on the trial as the crowning achievement
of the public defender leads inescapably to the privileging of the canny trial attorney over the caring and
effective advocate focused on both the client's legal and extra-legal needs.").
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and analyzes data might value a routinized metric, like the number of
motions filed, rather than the exercise of discretion over whether to file
them. Experienced public defenders understand that success cannot always
be measured in data. Could data properly measure a client's satisfaction
with fair process? Could a systems approach properly account for the way
in which a few months of sentence reduction can change a client's sense of
justice? For public defenders, small victories, silver linings, and the
avoidance of disaster are often the triumphs that sustain them. 83 In addition,
defenders may fear that a reporting system to collect data could result in
negative professional outcomes. Defenders may fear being criticized,
reported, or demoted because of data metrics that have little to do with the
quality of their lawyering.
Finally, defenders may have an instinctive resistance to data collection
based upon very real concerns that these data might be used against their
clients or their offices. Each decision to record a client secret or
confidence, even within the confines of a protected electronic file, merits
careful consideration. Are the risks of memorializing a client's
undocumented immigration status worth the prospective benefits associated
with data compilation or analysis? Should defenders now document
meetings with inculpatory eyewitnesses that they might otherwise have left
unrecorded? Will client data become relevant information in ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, or other collateral litigation? If so, will the
disclosure of those data undermine the interests of the office or of its
former clients? 84
Given their adversarial relationship with the state, defenders
necessarily-and reasonably-harbor suspicions about creating centralized
databases that contain information about their clients, their secrets, and
their strategies. Most defender databases would be quite useful for law
enforcement. Thus, in addition to data security issues arising from ordinary
data breaches or accidental disclosure, 85 defenders must also consider how
83. See Smith, Too Much Heart, supra note 79, at 1264 ("There is also nothing better than using
whatever skill or talent you possess to rescue a client from disaster, whether it is by winning a case at
trial or avoiding disaster through a well-negotiated plea and carefully crafted sentencing."); Michael E.
Tigar, Defending, 74 TEX. L. REV. 101 (1995) (providing a defense attorney's account of his
motivations for working in criminal defense); Ogletree, supra note 78, at 1271-74 (discussing how
empathy can be a source of motivation for public defenders).
84. Ellen Henak, When the Interests of Self. Clients, and Colleagues Collide: The Ethics of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 33 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 347, 348 (2009); Newmark, supra
note 48, at 728.
85. A data-driven defender practice certainly creates new risks related to data security; absent
proper security measures, if a single defender loses her laptop, she could disclose her clients' private
and privileged data, or even compromise the security of the entire defender system.
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to shield the information from formal legal requests. 86 As will be discussed
in Part IV, some of these concerns can be addressed through carefully
designed network structure, data encryption, and the development of
stronger legal and ethical rules to protect electronic records containing
attorney-client information. 87
IL HIGH-RISK PROFESSIONS, DATA, AND SYSTEMS
APPROACHES

A systems approach to error uses data collection and analysis to
develop systematic reforms that can identify risks, reduce errors, and
improve outcomes throughout the system. 88 A core premise of the systems
approach is that human errors are inevitable. 89 Accordingly, a systems
approach views most human error as the consequence of "upstream
systemic factors." 90 An organization or industry that successfully adopts a
systems approach is "not immune to adverse events," but it uses these
events to develop an "enhanced resilience of the system" of operations. 91
Rather than focusing on "isolated failures," the systems approach works to
create as safe and effective a system as "is practicable in the face of its
human and operational hazards." 92 While the systems approach was
developed to improve safety in high-risk industries, its principles can be
adapted to improve client outcomes in the high stakes practice of public
defense.
86. See, e.g., Coronado Police Officers Ass'n v. Carroll, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 553, 555 (Ct. App.
2003) (denying police association's request to expose the San Diego Defender's internal database);
State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publ'g Co. v. Bodiker, 731 N.E.2d 245, 254 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999)
(allowing press request for capital defense data subject to in camera review). See also United States v.
Grooters, No. 1:07-CR-001, 2008 WL 2561380, at *13 (W.D. Mich. June 24, 2008) ("Viewing the
overall conduct at issue, defendant's use of the computer password and access to the database
compromised the Federal Public Defender's office security and was a breach of her former employer's
trust. In that sense, the Federal Public Defender's office was a victim of defendant's conduct.").
87. See infra Part IV.B.
88. Helmreich, supra note 39, at 781; R. Wilf-Miron et al., From Aviation to Medicine: Applying
Concepts of Aviation Safety to Risk Management in Ambulatory Care, 12 QUALITY & SAFETY HEALTH
CARE 35, 35 (2003); James Reason, Human Error: Models and Management, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 768,
768 (2000) [hereinafter Reason, Models and Management].
89. See, e.g., Wilf-Miron et al., supra note 88, at 35; Reason, Models and Management, supra
note 88, at 768 ("The basic premise in the systems approach is that humans are fallible and errors are to
be expected .... ").
90. Id.
91. Id. at 770.
92. Id.
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A. THE SYSTEMS APPROACH TO OUTCOME IMPROVEMENT

Institutionalized interest in improving performance in complex and
hazardous fields began during World War II, as military aviation began to
address the negative impact that "people problems" were having on
mission success. 93 Other high-risk industries quickly joined in efforts to
understand and minimize these "human factors." 94 This study of human
error in high-stakes fields flourished in the 1980s95 as the public
increasingly witnessed high-profile catastrophes in aviation, 96 chemical and
petrochemical production, 97 nuclear power production, 98 space travel, 99 and
urban transportation. 100 These tragedies highlighted the potential for
"human errors [to] have adverse effects upon whole continents over several
generations." 101
93. James Reason, Professor Emeritus, Univ. of Manchester, Presentation at the Human Factors
Seminar, Helsinki: Human Factors: A Personal Perspective (Feb. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Reason, Human
Factors] (PowerPoint presentation on file with authors).
94. Id.
95. JAMES REASON, HUMAN ERROR 1 (1990) (hereinafter REASON, HUMAN ERROR] (pointing
out that the tragedies mentioned infra notes 96-100 were an "obvious impetus" for a "renewed interest"
in conducting "studies of errors for their own sake").
96. The Tenerife runway collision of 1977 was a fatal runway collision that killed 583 people,
and the deadliest accident in aviation history. Patrick Smith, How a Tiny Island Runway Became the
Site of the Deadliest Plane Crash Ever, Bus. INSIDER (Mar. 27, 2014, 11:35 AM),
http://www. businessinsider.com/dead! iest-p lane-crash-in-history-2014-3.
97. In 1984, a toxic gas leak at a Union Carbide pesticide plant in India killed at least 3,800
people and was, at the time, the worst industrial accident in history. Edward Broughton, The Bhopal
Disaster and its Aftermath: A Review, 4 ENVTL. HEALTH, no.6, at I, 1-6 (May 10, 2005). Then, in
1988, the Piper Alpha oil platform explosion killed I 67 people, becoming the deadliest oil-rig accident
in history. Terry Macalister, Piper Alpha Disaster: How 167 Oil Rig Workers Died, GUARDIAN (July 4,
2013, 2: 17 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/business/20 I 3/jul/04/piper-alpha-disaster-167-oil-rig.
98. The Three Mile Island nuclear meltdown of 1979 was the most serious accident in the history
of the United States' commercial nuclear power plant industry. Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island
Accident, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM'N, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rrn/doc-collections/factsheets/3mile-isle.html (last updated Dec. 12, 20 I 4). The 1986 Chernobyl disaster was the largest
nuclear accident in world history. Chernobyl Accident 1986, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS'N,
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/chernobyl-accident (last updated
Apr. 2015).
99. The 1986 explosion of the space shuttle Challenger killed all seven astronauts on board, and
millions of Americans watched the world's worst space disaster on live television. On This Day: 28
January, 1986: Seven Dead in Space Shuttle Disaster, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/
hi/dates/stories/january/28/newsid_2506000/2506 I 61.stm (last visited June 30, 20 I 5).
IOOFor example, in 1987, the capsizing of the Herald of Free Enterprise, a Belgian car ferry, killed
nearly seventy people. On This Day: 6 March, 1987: Hundreds Trapped as Car Ferry Capsizes, BBC,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/6/newsid_2515000/25 I 5923.stm (last visited
June 30, 2015). Additionally, the King's Cross London Tube station fire in 1987 killed thirty-one
people and injured dozens of others. On This Day: 18 November, 1987: King's Cross Station Fire
"Kills 2 7," BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/18/newsid_25 I 9000/
2519675.stm (last visited June 30, 2015).
IOI. REASON, HUMAN ERROR, supra note 95, at I.
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This interest in human error and its consequences dovetailed with
cognitive psychologists' research, which demonstrated that social science
could often both predict and explain human error. 102 As scientists,
psychologists, and risk managers studied the high-profile tragedies of the
1970s and 1980s, they realized that techniques that only targeted human
error could not prevent large-scale disasters. 103 Evidence demonstrated that
these human errors stemmed from widespread organizational failures that
were endemic to the operational systems of many high-risk industries. 104
So, armed with an understanding of the "covert control processes of human
cognition," social scientists began to apply the lessons of engineering and
science to human error. 105 The result was a systems approach to risk
management that targeted organizational culture and institutional practice
rather than individual errors.
Data strongly suggest that the systems approach more accurately
captures the true causes of adverse outcomes in complex and high-risk
industries. 106 Most negative outcomes have multiple causes; they rarely
occur due to a single person's actions. 107 Research further indicates that
these multiple causes do not stem from isolated errors or unusual risks;
rather they arise due to the convergence of common errors and ordinary
risks. 108
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 173. See generally CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS (1999).
105. REASON, HUMAN ERROR, supra note 95, at 248. See generally PERROW, supra note 104.
106. See Reason, Models and Management, supra note 88, at 768 (finding that individuals were
"blameless" in more than 90 percent of aviation maintenance errors); Mark R. Chassin & Elise C.
Becher, The Wrong Patient, 136 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 826, 826 (2002) (evaluating a "wrong
patient" surgical mishap and identifying as many as seventeen "distinct errors" that caused the adverse
outcome, "no single one of which could have caused this adverse event by itself," including systemic or
organization failures, such as "absent or misused protocols for patient identification and informed
consent, systematically faulty exchange of information among caregivers, and poorly functioning
teams"); Zane Robinson Wolf & Ronda G. Hughes, Error Reporting and Disclosure, in 2 PATIENT
SAFETY AND QUALITY: AN EVIDENCE-BASED HANDBOOK FOR NURSES 333, 333-34 (Ronda G. Hughes
ed., 2008), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK2652/ ("Analysis of reported errors have revealed
many 'hidden dangers' (near misses, dangerous situations, and deviations or variations) that point to
system vulnerabilities, not intentional acts of clinician performance .... ").
107. See, e.g., Scott A. Shappell & Douglas A. Wiegmann, The Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System-HFACS, DEP'T OF TRANSP., FED. AVIATION ADMIN. 1 (2000),
https://www .nifc.gov/firelnfo/firelnfo_ documents/humanfactors_ classAnly .pdf ("[A ]viati on accidents
are the end result of a number of causes ....").
108. Reason, Models and Management, supra note 88, at 769 (noting that mishaps are not
"random" but "tend to fall into recurrent patterns," and produce negative outcomes when many mishaps
"momentarily line up to permit a trajectory of accident opportunity"); See, e.g., Shappell & Wiegmann,
supra note I 07, at 4 (categorizing various unsafe aviation acts).
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Nevertheless, the systems approach is often counterintuitive to
professionals who work in high-risk fields. 109 Professionals tend to assume
a "person approach" to error. 110 The person approach (also known as the
"human" or "individual" approach) concentrates on locating the person(s)
whose errors are causally linked to an undesired outcome. 111 The person
approach views error as the product of "aberrant mental processes such as
forgetfulness, inattention, poor motivation, carelessness, negligence, and
recklessness." 112 It thus ignores the extent to which institutional practice
and culture contribute to errors, and thereby overlooks the vast potential for
across-the-board improvements that could otherwise be identified and
implemented with a systems approach. 113
The modern systems approach has been strongly influenced by James
Reason's approach to error management. As discussed in Parts I.Band III,
we do not advocate an error-focused approach to public defense.
Nevertheless, Reason's approach offers useful insights about understanding
and reforming organizational culture and operations.
Critical of the way that the "person approach" focused on individual
human errors, Reason argues that human errors have multiple causes, and
that effective risk management should address all of those causes. Reason
analogizes the operating system of a high-risk industry to "stacks of slices
of Swiss cheese." 114 In Reason's analogy, each slice of cheese represents
an individual or institutional layer of defense against risk and error. The
I 09. See, e.g., Doyle supra note 2, at I I 8 (Professionals "view error as a failure of character" that
produces "a common reaction by physician[s]: 'How can there be an error without negligence?"'
(quoting Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851, 1851 (1994))). See also Reason, supra
note 88, at 768 (As of2000, the "person approach remain[ed] the dominant tradition in medicine .... ");
Duke Univ. Med. Ctr., Definitions of Error, PATIENT SAFETY-QUALITY IMPROVEMENT: ANATOMY OF
AN ERROR, http://patientsafetyed.duhs.duke.edu/module_e/definitions.htrnl (last visited June 30, 2015)
(A belief that "the individual should have acted differently, and thus is responsible for the
consequences" of his or her conduct "is the basis of the 'shame and blame' culture that has been so
common in healthcare.").
110. See, e.g., id. ("'Human error' ... implies that the individual should have acted differently,
and thus us responsible for the consequence of that conduct.").
111. Reason, Models and Management, supra note 88, at 768.
I 12. Id. See also Duke Univ. Med. Ctr., supra note 109.
I 13. Reason, Models and Management, supra note 88, at 768. As Reason notes, executives and
managers often prefer a person approach to error because it "uncouple[s] a person's unsafe acts from
any institutional responsibility." Id.
114. James Reason, The Contribution of Latent Human Failures to the Breakdown of Complex
Systems, 327 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS B 475, 475 (1990). While Reason's Swiss cheese model has been
criticized as failing to "account for the detailed interrelationships among causal factors," it remains a
central theory of risk management in complex and high-risk professions. James T Lux!ll!lj & Kimberlee
Kauffeld, Evaluating the Effect of Technology Insertion into the National Airspace System, RUTGERS
SCHOLAR (2003), http://rutgersscholar.rutgers.edu/volume05/luxhoj-kauffeld/luxhoj-kauffeld.htrn.
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holes in each slice of cheese represent deficiencies or mistakes that may
allow errors or negative outcomes to occur. 115 While risks or errors might
pass through a hole in one slice of cheese, the holes in the other slices
would ideally all be in different places. 116 If so, each layer of cheese would
block any problem that passed through from a previous layer. 117 However,
if the holes in the cheese align, risks and errors pass unimpeded through the
entire stack of cheese slices, causing errors and adverse-or even
catastrophic-outcomes. 118
In Reason's model, operator errors or "active errors" are merely the
last layer of cheese-the layer in which a human mistake contributed to, or
caused, an ultimate error or adverse outcome. 119 Relying on empirical
studies and social science, Reason argues that humans who err on the
"sharp end" of practice (the end closest to the outcome) are more likely to
be the "inheritors than the instigators" of adverse outcomes. 120 Reason
identifies three other "slices" of "latent pathogens" that contribute to sharp
end errors: latent conditions of risk in the work environment, supervisory
failures, and organizational factors. 121 An effective systems approach to
practice must address each of these categories.
First, latent conditions of risk create the working environment in
which operator errors occur. 122 These latent conditions may include
environmental or technological factors, such as the physical environment,
or the state of the system's critical technology. For example, an inaccurate
weather report might constitute a latent risk for a pilot's landing error, and
a miscalibrated pulse oximeter might constitute a latent risk for a doctor's
115. JAMES REASON, MANAGING THE RISKS OF ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENTS 9 & fig.1.4 (1997)
[hereinafter REASON, MANAGING THE RISKS]. See also Paul M. Salmon, Michael Regan & Ian
Johnston, Managing Road User Error in Australia: Where Are We Now, Where Are We Going and How
Are We Going to Get There?, in MULTIMODAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT AND HUMAN FACTORS:
CROSSING THE BORDERS OF MEDICAL, AVIATION, ROAD AND RAIL INDUSTRIES 143, 145-46 (Jose M.
Anca, Jr. ed., 2007).
116. REASON, MANAGING THE RISKS, supra note 115, at 12 fig. 1.5.
117. /d.atll.
118. Id. at 12 fig. 1.5.
119. REASON, HUMAN ERROR, supra note 95, at 173. These operator errors typically have direct,
immediate, and adverse impacts on an outcome and had been a main focus of the person approach.
REASON, MANAGING THE RISKS, supra note 115, at 10.
120. Reason, Human Factors, supra note 93.
121. Id.; REASON, HUMAN ERROR, supra note 95, at 197-99. Other researchers have proposed
similar models. See, e.g., Charles Vincent, Sally Taylor-Adams & Nicola Stanhope, Framework to
Analyzing Risk and Safety in Clinical Medicine, 315 BRIT. MED. J. 1154, 1154 (1998) ("Adverse events
usually originate in a variety of systemic features operating at different levels-the task, the team, the
work environment, and the organisation.").
122. REASON, HUMAN ERROR, supra note 95, at 205.
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treatment error. Latent conditions of risk also encompass the collective and
individual working conditions of the people who work within the
system. 123 Research demonstrates that working conditions such as fatigue,
overwork, stress, illness, and impaired mental states are important-and
often remediable-preconditions for professional error. 124
Second, supervisory failures may contribute to professional errors and
negative outcomes. 125 An undesirably high supervisor-to-subordinate ratio
may, in itself, constitute a supervisory failure. 126 However, supervisory
failures may also reflect substantive errors in professional judgment, such
as when a supervisor gives inappropriate or incorrect instructions to her
subordinates. 127 Another common supervisory failure occurs when
supervisors fail to address known problems or ignore repeated violations of
organizational rules and regulations. 128
Finally, organizational influences can be strong factors in predisposing
organizations toward error. 129 Institutional decisions about matters such as
resource allocation, optimal workloads, and professional training all shape
professionals' working environments. For example, if an organization
commits too few resources to a process and expects its employees to work
unreasonably long hours under strenuous conditions, the organization has
created preconditions that increase the likelihood of human error. 130
By insisting upon the investigation and analysis of all of these factors,
Reason and others developed systems-conscious frameworks for the
investigation of industrial accidents and near misses. 131 While these
frameworks were initially designed to be retrospective investigative tools,
they evolved into proactive tools for the design of "error tolerant
123. Shappell & Wiegmann, supra note 107, at 11. In highly collaborative work, such as surgery,
ineffective cooperation among essential members of the professional team may also be a precondition
for error.
124. Id.; REASON, HUMAN ERROR, supra note 95, at 206.
125. REASON, MANAGING THE RISKS, supra note 115, at 121.
126. Id. at 47.
127. Id. at 25.
128. Id. at 47.
129. Id. at 135.
130. Id. at 122; Shappell & Wiegmann, supra note 107, at 7.
131. See, e.g., Joanne De Landre, Geny Gibb & Nicole Walters, Using Incident Investigation
Tools Proactively for Incident Prevention, AUS . SOC'Y AIR SAFETY INVESTIGATORS 1-12 (2006),
http://asasi.org/papers/2006/Payne_Stewart_Learjet_Investigation_De%20Landre_Gibb_Walters_DOC.
pdf (describing the Incident Cause Analysis Method ("!CAM"), which is used in aviation to investigate
airplane error). ICAM seeks to identify the full range of factors-active and latent, individual and
organizational-that contributed to an accident or to a near-miss event. Id. at 2-3. At the conclusion of
the investigation, analysts issue a report and recommend system changes and improvements that will
reduce the likelihood of another similar error or outcome. Id.
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workplaces" that maximize the likelihood of positive outcomes. 132
Over the last several decades, many complex, high-risk professions
have embraced a systems approach to error management. 133 Some have
been so successful that they can be characterized as "high reliability
organizations." 134 Industries such as aviation and medicine continue to
refine their respective systems approaches to incorporate new data and
improve the safety and quality of their industry outcomes. 135
B. AVIATION AND HEALTHCARE: Two SUCCESSFUL EXAMPLES OF THE
SYSTEMS APPROACH

Aviation and healthcare are two industries that have adopted a systems
approach to safety and performance with largely positive results. While
beyond the scope of this Article, the decades-long march to a systemic
approach to risk, error, operator action, and outcome has transformed those
industries. 136 In 2015, a person's chances of having a safe, complicationfree flight or undergoing a successful medical procedure are far greater
than even thirty years prior in the 1980s. Perhaps even more importantly,
we know why those risks have been reduced and can study the data to
reduce the risks even further.
Decades of increasingly sophisticated implementation of the systems
approach in aviation, medicine, and other high-risk industries have
produced a vast literature about what makes the systems approach
successful. 137 High-risk professions with successful systems approaches
132. Id. at 10.
133. Such error management systems seek to "understand[] the nature and extent of error,
chang[e] the conditions that induce error, deterrnin[e] behaviours that prevent or mitigate error, and
train[] personnel in their use." Helrnreich, supra note 39, at 781.
134. Reason, Models and Management, supra note 88, at 768. Reason identifies three highreliability organizations that use a systems approach to error: "US Navy nuclear aircraft carriers,
nuclear power plants, and air traffic control centres." Id. at 770.
135. Anesthesiology, which is widely acknowledged as the medical specialization that has been
most successful in implementing systems-based reforms to improve patient outcomes and reduce
medical error, based its reforms upon those of the aviation industry. Gaba, supra note 39, at 785. Other
fields use a systems approach to reporting, analyzing, and mitigating risk, error, and negative outcomes.
See, e.g., John Holloway, A Systems Approach to Error Reduction in Criminal Justice, QUATIRONE
CTR. FOR FAIR ADMIN. JUST. 4 (Feb. 2014), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/976/
(engineering and manufacturing); Wilf-Miron et al., supra note 88, at 35-36 (nuclear power production
and ambulatory care); Barach & Small, supra note 39, at 759 (petrochemical processing, space
exploration, and steel production). See also Reason, Models and Management, supra note 88, at 768.
136. See generally Michelle L. Harper & Robert L. Helmreich, JdentifYing Barriers to the Success
of a Reporting System, in 3 ADVANCES IN PATIENT SAFETY: FROM RESEARCH TO IMPLEMENTATION
167 (Kenn Henriksen et al. eds., 2008).
137. See generally MICHAEL D. FERGUSON & SEAN NELSON, AVIATION SAFETY: A BALANCED
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tend to:
•

Identify and gather data about risks, errors, and outcomes,
including data about near misses and consequence-free
errors; 138

•

Adopt educational approaches to risk and error so that
participants view errors as learning opportunities rather than
professional failures; 139

•

Value system reform and improvement over operator
discipline and disgrace; 140

•

Implement a strong and constantly evolving data-driven
feedback loop through which the organization assesses data,
experiments with improvement strategies, evaluates the
resultant outcomes, and implements those strategies that
demonstrably improve outcomes; 141

•

Engage front-end actors at the "sharp end" of practice with
those at the "blunt end" of the practice, in order to enhance the
systemic approach to outcome improvement; 142 and

•

Address risks, errors, and negative outcomes in a manner that
participants perceive as ')ust." 143

INDUSTRY APPROACH (2014) (discussing aviation safety); JOHN DAVIES, ALASTAIR Ross & BRENDAN
WALLACE, SAFETY MANAGEMENT: A QUALITATIVE SYSTEMS APPROACH (2003); ERROR REDUCTION
IN HEALTH CARE: A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO IMPROVING PATIENT SAFETY (Patrice L. Spath ed., 2000);
Megan A. Adams, Joseph Elmunzer & James M. Scheiman, Effect of a Health System's Medical Error
Disclosure Program on Gastroenterology-Related Claims Rates and Costs, 109 AM. J.
GASTROENTEROLOGY 460 (2014); Richard C. Boothman et al., Nurturing a Culture of Patient Safety
and Achieving Lower Malpractice Risk Through Disclosure: Lessons Learned and Future Directions,
28 FRONTIERS OF HEALTH SERVICES MGMT., Spring 2012, at 13, 13 (2012); R. P. Mahajan, Critical
Incident Reporting and Learning, 105 BRIT. J. ANAESTHESIA 69, 69-75 (2010); Shappell & Wiegmann,
supra note 107.
138. Barach & Small, supra note 39, at 759.
139. Wilf-Miron et al., supra note 88; Barach & Small, supra note 39, at 759.
140. Eileen Munro, Improving Safety in Medicine: A Systems Approach, 185 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 2, 3
(2004).
141. Barach & Small, supra note 39, at 761; Global Aviation Info. Network, A Roadmap to Just
Culture:
Enhancing
the
Safety
Environment,
FLIGHT
SAFETY
FOUND.
(2004),
http://flightsafety.org/files/just_culture.pdf [hereinafter GAIN, Roadmap].
142. In medicine, the "blunt end" is the professional process that occurs away from the patient.
Duke Univ. Med. Ctr., Vocabulary, PATIENT SAFETY-QUALITY IMPROVEMENT: ANATOMY OF AN
ERROR, http://patientsafetyed.duhs.duke.edu/module_e/vocabulary .html (last visited July 14, 2015).
Accord GAIN, Roadmap, supra note 141, at 2 (discussing the need to improve communications
between pilots and air traffic controllers).
143. Barach & Small, supra note 39, at 759, 761. See infra note 267 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Reason's concept of"just culture."
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We believe that, with suitable adjustments, public defenders can
emulate these characteristics and apply a data-driven systems approach to
the practice of public defense.
C. ADAPTING THE SYSTEMS APPROACH TO PUBLIC DEFENSE PRACTICE
To explore the application of a systems approach to public defense,
we compare public defender practices to the complex, high-risk
professional practices of aviation and medicine. 144 Both industries provide
a useful starting point to assess where the systems approach aptly applies to
public defender practice, and where the approach requires modification.
Like pilots and doctors, lawyers confront problems that are both
"complicated" and "complex." 145 Atul Gawande's explanation of the
difference between "complicated" and "complex" problems is instructive.
A problem is "complicated" when it consists of multiple problems and
challenges. 146 To resolve a complicated problem, professionals may need to
work with teams of experts and support personnel, or experiment with
varying techniques or strategies. 147 Complicated problems may produce
multiple failures and setbacks. However, once solved, a complicated
problem generally remains solved. So, for example, sending a rocket to the
moon is a complicated problem, but once you figure out how to send the
rocket to the moon, you can "repeat the process with other rockets and
perfect it." 148
In contrast, "complex" problems defy ready solutions. Every complex
problem is different. Complex problems, argues Gawande, are like
children: a parent can master the complex problem of child rearing, but
every child is different. Therefore, parenting remains complex, regardless
of how many children one raises. 149
Pilots, doctors, and lawyers are trained in the skilled resolution of
complicated problems: how to land a plane, how to prescribe medication,
144. To the extent that these professions have succeeded in developing safety cultures that
embrace a data-driven systems approach, it can be difficult to differentiate this approach from the
profession itself. The safety culture that characterizes the aviation industry is largely indistinguishable
from modem aviation culture itself. The medical profession presents a slightly easier comparison, as
that safety movement began in the 1990s.
145. See ATUL GAivANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO: How TO GET THINGS RIGHT 48-49
(2009) (noting that there are three different kinds of problems in the world: "the simple, the
complicated, and the complex").
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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how to draft a plea agreement. However, there are no rote solutions for the
complex situations in which those complicated problems arise. 150 As a
result, in complex, high-risk professions like aviation, medicine, and public
defense, "threat and error are ubiquitous," 151 professional practice is highly
individuated, and success is always uncertain. 152 In each of these fields,
new professionals must be certified or licensed. 153 Thereafter, they are
subjected to ongoing professional educational requirements. 154 However,
standardized compliance requirements rarely address the wide range of
practices and experiences that these professionals face in their daily lives.
All remain complex and challenging professions. If pilots and surgeons can
learn from, and work within, a data-driven systems approach to
professional practice, perhaps public defenders can do the same.
Nevertheless, there are significant differences between piloting an
airplane, practicing medicine, and representing poor people charged with
crimes. These differences highlight the need for the modification of the
systems approach as applied to public defense.
1. Adversarial Practice Discourages, or Precludes, Stakeholders from
Sharing Information, Thereby Obscuring Some Causal Risk Factors
While Actively Manufacturing New Ones

In fields such as aviation and medicine, all the actors share broad
common goals. In aviation, everyone-from the pilot, to the mechanic, to
the air traffic controller-wants each plane to land safely. In healthcare,
everyone-from the doctor, to the orderly, to the laboratory technician, to
the insurance company-wants medical examination or treatment to make
each patient as healthy as possible. Of course, aviation professionals
confront the vagaries of weather and face the risks of hijackers and
terrorists. Notwithstanding aviation's best efforts to develop weather radar
detection and high-tech security systems, aviation can never fully eliminate
these risks. However, the risks are mitigated by the cooperative nature of
the aviation industry: mechanics, air traffic controllers, pilots, flight crews,
and ground crews work cooperatively to accomplish a common goal: the
150. See id. at 50 (explaining that there "is no straightforward recipe" for the resolution of
complex problems such as critical patient care).
151. Helmreich, supra note 39, at 782.
152. GAWANDE, supra note 145, at 49.
153. See,
e.g.,
Licenses
&
Certificates,
FED.
AVIATION
ADMIN.,
http://www.faa.gov/licenses_certificates/ (last modified Nov. 4, 2014) (listing licensing, certification
and continuing education requirements for aircraft crews, pilots, and mechanics); AM. MED. ASS'N,
STATE MEDICAL LICENSURE REQUIREMENTS AND STATISTICS (2014).
154. See sources cited supra note 153.
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safe landing of every plane. Similarly, doctors, nurses, orderlies, insurance
companies, and healthcare administrators share the common goals of
promoting health, preventing illness, curing disease, and alleviating pain. 155
Thus, while different stakeholders may have different views about how to
prioritize various aspects of the larger goal, they share a common vision. 156
As a result, in both industries, a broad range of stakeholders work
collaboratively to implement a data-driven systems approach to error
-reduction and risk management.
In contrast, the criminal justice system is deliberately and vigorously
adversarial. 157 In criminal justice, the relevant stakeholders largely have
different interests. Public defenders see:~ acquittal, dismissal, or the lowest
possible sanction, while police and prosecutors actively pursue conviction
and punishment. 158
While there are several prominent collaborative criminal justice
efforts to improve system outcomes, these efforts are confined to
addressing the few outcomes that all criminal justice stakeholders
deplore-primarily, wrongful convictions. 159 These collaborative
approaches depend heavily upon stakeholders sharing information. These
efforts prioritize accurate outcomes and describe "preserving public safety"
as the "core" mission of "criminal justice practitioners." 160 While accuracy
and public safety may be the core missions of police, prosecutors, judges,
and probation officers, they are not the core missions of public defenders.
155. Of course, both fields have experience with destructive insiders, who either want to cause
airline crashes or injure patients. However, the existence of individuals who deviate from the industrywide norm does not undermine the industry's institutional commitment to a common goal. See
generally JEFFREY PRICE & JEFFREY FORREST, PRACTICAL AVIATION SECURITY: PREDICTING AND
PREVENTING FUTURE THREATS 423 (2d ed. 2012) (discussing various threats to the aviation
community).
156. For example, the doctor may want a patient to take a name-brand medication, while the
insurance company may insist that she prescribe the generic version. While the insurance company acts
in a price-conscious way, it also insists that the generic drug is equally efficacious, and therefore, the
company's price consciousness does not undermine its commitment to maximizing healthcare
outcomes.
157. Smith, Too Much Heart, supra note 79, at 1208--09 ("[D]efenders are civil libertarians,
protecting the rights of criminal defendants and the rest of us through the adversarial system.").
158. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256-58 (1967) ("[D]efense counsel has
no ... obligation to ascertain or present the truth .... If he can confuse a witness, even a truthful one,
or make him appear at a disadvantage, unsure or indecisive, that will be his normal course. Our interest
in not convicting the innocent permits counsel to put the State to its proof, to put the State's case in the
worst possible light, regardless of what he thinks or knows to be the truth.").
159. See generally Holloway, supra note 135 (highlighting the main points discussed in the
University of Pennsylvania Law School Quattrone Center's November 2013 Dialogue, which focused
on the need for reduction of wrongful convictions).
160. Id. at 7.
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Indeed, those goals are often incompatible with an outcome-optimizing
systems approach to public defense.
Our proposal for a data-driven systems approach to public defense is
both narrower (focusing only on indigent defense) and broader (targeting a
wider range of issues, errors, and risks) than the collaborative investigation
of wrongful convictions. A systems approach to public defense must reflect
the defense attorney's unique function as a partisan advocate for her
clients' success. Within applicable ethical and legal constraints, a systems
approach to public defense must seek outcomes that serve the clients' best
interests, regardless of whether those outcomes increase accuracy or
promote public safety.
This means that, unlike pilots and doctors, public defenders must
develop their systems approach in a data "silo." They must treat other
participants in the system as "hostile enemies," even though their policies
and practices also impact client outcomes. 161 Using the tools of adversarial
litigation, prosecutors are legally allowed-or even encouraged-to
magnify the risks faced by people charged with crimes. Prosecutors and
police, both powerful criminal justice stakeholders, actively work to
convict or increase the sentences of indigent defendants. As commentators
have amply detailed, sweeping prosecutorial discretion over charging
decisions, sentencing enhancements, and sentencing departures has
distorted the criminal justice system. 162
In cooperative industries, organizations that use a systems approach
can work "backwards" with collaborative stakeholders, exploring all
stakeholder contributions to a negative outcome in order to identify its
multiple causes. For example, in the highly circumscribed but
institutionally cooperative field of aviation, there is a limited pool of risks
and a limited range of causal factors that produce certain outcomes.
Investigators can generally trace accidents or near misses back to even
previously unidentified causal factors.
161. Id. at 8 (describing the adversary system as a challenge to information-sharing about errors
and "near misses").
162. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AN OFFER You CAN'T REFUSE: How us PROSECUTORS FORCE
DRUG
DEFENDANTS
TO
PLEAD
GUILTY
(2013),
http://www.hrw.org/reports/
2013/12/05/offer-you-can-t-refuse. In some ways, the difficulties that prosecutorial misconduct and
discretion pose to defenders are like the risks that pilots face. For instance, like harsh weather
conditions, bad facts, aggressive charging policies, erroneous decisions about Brady obligations, sharp
adversarial practices, and police and prosecutorial errors will always exist. Like security threats, some
unethical prosecutorial and dishonest police officers will always try to slip past the "security systems"
established by the Constitution and monitored by judges.
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In contrast, other criminal justice stakeholders will rarely agree with
public defenders about whether a particular case outcome is negative. As a
result, those stakeholders have no institutional incentive to share
information about causal risk factors, and the adversary system ensures that
public defenders have no legal right to discover that information. 163 In fact,
certain stakeholders might have an incentive to hide those risk factors if
that would result in higher conviction rates. Defenders can be alert for these
risks and can develop early-warning systems to try to detect them.
Ultimately, however, many of these risks will contribute to client outcomes
but will remain entirely hidden from defenders' view. A systems approach
to public defense must grapple with these hidden causal factors.
Moreover, even if public defenders had perfect information about
other stakeholders' policies and practices, weighing the relative importance
of those causal factors would still present a challenge for a systems
approach to public defense. As the human complexity of a problem
increases, it becomes increasingly difficult to identify-much less weighthe multiple causal factors that contribute to outcomes. 164
Doctors and lawyers take their patients and clients-and their
respective problems-as they find them. Doctors provide healthcare for
patients who have undisclosed pre-existing conditions or who withhold
crucial healthcare information. This means that doctors with imperfect
knowledge must treat complicated problems that afflict complex, and
ultimately mortal, patients. Risk factors are everywhere. 165
Similarly, public defenders represent clients with unique backgrounds,
disabilities, and challenges. Moreover, like patients in a high-volume
public hospital, public defender clients share a common risk factor:
poverty. 166 Many also confront risks associated with their race, genderidentity, sexual orientation, ethnicity, national origin, language, or
163. See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion
and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 862---{;3 (1995) ("The prosecutor's
decision to charge an accused is largely subject to the prosecutor's discretion. The prosecutor's
charging discretion is, for the most part, unreviewable."); Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform
Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 905 (2007) ("Prosecutorial exercise of discretion is generally
unreviewable if the prosecutor had probable cause, unless prosecutors rely on invidious characteristics
like race or religion.").
164. See supra Part II.C.1 for a discussion of how a systems approach to public defense should
collect and analyze data about causal risks.
165. Pia Maria Jonsson, Goran Tomson & Lars Raf, Letter: No Fault Compensation Protects
Patients in Nordic Countries, 321 BRIT. MED. J. 506, 506 (2000) ("Clinical decision making is
complicated and often includes an element of'norrnal' risk taking.").
166. Poverty increases a criminal defendant's likelihood of conviction. By definition and statutory
mandate, public defenders are appointed to represent the poor.
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religion. 167 They are more likely to be illiterate, 168 mentally ill, 169 or
suffering from developmental disabilities. 170 As a result, it can be quite
difficult to isolate the risks associated with an adverse outcome. Was it a
client's disability that undermined her credibility or impacted her
testimony? Did implicit biases based on race, gender, or age impact the
result? 171 Did miscommunication based on language difficulties or lack of
cultural competency affect the outcome? At the intersection of race, class,
and otherness, these considerations can distort the proper assessment of
risk.
2. The Complex and Adversarial Nature of Criminal Practice Makes It
Difficult for Public Defenders to Define "Successful" or
"Unsuccessful" Case Outcomes
In aviation and, to a lesser degree, in medicine, there is general
agreement about what constitutes a negative outcome. Every plane crash is,
by definition, a catastrophic outcome. Every time a patient leaves the
operating table with a sponge sewn inside him, there has been a medical
failure. 172 These clearly negative outcomes are easy to quantify. Often, they
are high-profile tragedies that prompt strong public demand for answers.
For example, catastrophic aviation events produce immediate and
167. Terry Brooks & Shubhangi Deoras, New Frontiers in Public Defense, 17 CRIM. JUST., Spring
2002, at 51, 51 (recognizing that "clients need to address underlying problems such as poverty,
addiction, mental illness, inadequate education, lack of access to social support services, and severe
family conflict").
168. Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1449, 1474 (2005) (citing DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 4 (1999) (pointing out that 40 percent of state prisoners are illiterate)).
169. Amanda C. Pustilnik, Prisons of the Mind: Social Value and Economic Inefficiency in the
Criminal Justice Response to Mental 11/ness, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 217, 226-27 (2005)
("Nationwide, there are far more severely mentally ill individuals confined in prisons and jails than
treated in all mental health facilities collectively. Annually, over 300,000 adults and children with
mental illnesses-many of whom have committed only a public order infraction or no offense at allare confined in state and federal prisons, jails, and juvenile corrections facilities.").
170. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Dialogue Approach to Miranda Warnings and Waiver, 49
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1437, 1459 (2012) ("[S]ome estimates have determined that there are approximately
200,000 intellectually disabled people imprisoned in the United States.").
171. See, e.g., Andrew Taslitz, Police Are People Too: Cognitive Obstacles to, and Opportunities
for, Police Getting the Individualized Suspicion Judgment Right, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 15-16
(2010); L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143, 1147
(2010).
172. Steven H. Woolf et al., A String of Mistakes: The Importance of Cascade Analysis in
Describing, Counting and Preventing Medical Errors, 2 ANNALS FAMILY MED. 317, 317 (2004)
(identifying "adverse drug events" and "surgical mishaps" as the "medical errors that are easiest to
recognize").
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"exhaustive investigation into causal factors." 173 Medical tragedies create
million dollar liabilities and policy changes. 174 These, in tum, generate both
"public reports ... and remedial action[s]" that are rapidly implemented
across the industry .175
Wrongful convictions are the most widely studied catastrophic
outcomes in public defense. 176 However, reported wrongful convictions are
few and far between; thus, they comprise an inadequate volume of data for
a meaningful systems approach. 177 Unlike plane crashes, wrongful
convictions are often discovered decades after they occur. During those
decades, criminal law and public defender practices may have changed
dramatically. This means that, despite aggressive retrospective analysis,
wrongful convictions may produce limited data that are still relevant to
contemporary public defender practice. Moreover, there is little
accountability for the lawyers involved in those cases; many will have long
since left criminal practice or retired from law altogether. 178 So, defining
success by the factual accuracy of a conviction would do little to advance
public defenders' understanding of how to improve outcomes.
More importantly, defining success based on the accuracy of verdicts
fundamentally misunderstands the public defender's role as a partisan
advocate and underestimates the extent to which sentences-rather than
173. Helmreich, supra note 39, at 781.
174. Joanna C. Schwartz, A Dose of Reality for Medical Malpractice Reform, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1224, 1267 (2013) (describing how lawsuits provide information about hospital practices and
procedures).
175. Helmreich, supra note 39, at 781.
176. Aviation has relatively few catastrophic incidents, but has nevertheless developed a rich
dataset that supports a strong systems approach to error. That dataset is drawn from the study of both
near-miss and successful aviation events. For a discussion of how public defenders can develop data on
these types of events, see infra Part III.B.
177. Charles Lanier & James Acker, Capital Punishment, the Moratorium Movement, and
Empirical Questions: Looking Beyond Innocence, Race, and Bad Lawyering in Death Penalty Cases,
10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 577, 593 (2004) (citing Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael Radelet,
Miscarriages ofJustice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 25-27 (1987)).
178. See supra notes 176-177 and accompanying text for a discussion about the challenges in
using wrongful convictions as a dataset for building a systems approach to error. In misdemeanor and
low-level felony cases, wrongfully convicted defendants often accept their convictions as another
"collateral" consequence of their confrontation with state power. And, defendants in low-level felony
and misdemeanor cases who want to litigate their innocence often proceed pro se in their appeals, and
almost inevitably proceed pro se in post-conviction proceedings. Since the available wrongful
conviction datasets are limited to capital and high-level felonies, they offer little information about
developing data-driven approaches to practice in misdemeanor and low-level felony practices.
Moreover, the dataset on wrongful convictions is made up of cases in which clients are represented by
public defenders, contract attorneys, and private counsel. See generally Anderson & Heaton, supra note
3 (conducting a study in Philadelphia comparing outcomes in murder cases when defendants were
assigned to public defenders versus appointed counsel).
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verdicts-are defenders' practice targets. Furthermore, by virtue of a
defender's ethical duty to challenge the government's case with the utmost
zeal, "inaccurate" acquittals count as positive outcomes for defenders, just
as "accurate" convictions are still negative outcomes. As any trial lawyer
will tell you, winning a case you should lose is the ultimate badge of honor,
while losing a case you should lose is still a loss.
Perhaps more practically, a focus on the accuracy of verdicts also fails
to account for the fact that over 95 percent of cases are now resolved by
plea bargains. 179 Defining success as a positive verdict misses the larger
systemic issues affecting outcomes for the vast majority of participants in
the criminal justice system. 180
As in much of medicine, criminal defense outcomes are inherently
uncertain. Those uncertainties are exacerbated by the wide variability of
cases with similar charges. Two men arrested with the same amount of
cocaine might face different charging decisions and receive different
outcomes depending on the circumstances of their arrests, prior criminal
histories, gang affiliations, or other contextual factors. Doctors face similar
challenges in establishing benchmarks to define success. Despite an everevolving understanding of disease, illness, and the human body, medical
knowledge remains imperfect. From the common cold to cancer, the
profession is still learning about widespread health problems. The riskiness
and uncertainty of medical science mean that doctors do not always know
how to define success or failure. How long should it have taken a patient to
recover from illness? How much mobility should surgery have restored to a
patient's arm? Did chemotherapy beneficially prolong a patient's life, or
did it merely prolong the patient's suffering?
Even in cases presenting similar facts and charges, public defenders
represent high-risk clients whose individual situations increase the wide
variability of likely outcomes. Just as surgeons generally treat people who
are already sick, public defenders generally represent people who are
already in crisis. Further, many of those clients have lengthy criminal
histories that, like a disease, weaken the person's ability to overcome their
legal challenges. Legal outcomes are always uncertain, and if success is
defined by acquittal or dismissal, the odds are staggeringly stacked against
public defenders succeeding. Public defenders often work to mitigate the
179. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (''Ninety-seven percent offederal convictions
and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.").
180. See Beeman, Using Data, supra note 2, at 5 ("[C]ertain metrics have no value, such as
tracking offices 'successes' when success is defined only as acquittal.").
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harmful effect of the "disease" rather than to cure it. 181 And,
overwhelmingly, criminal defendants are likely to be convicted of some
crime, even if it is not the crime for which they were arrested. Amidst these
high-risk conditions, it is difficult for public defenders to qualify or
quantify successful outcomes.
For all of these reasons, adapting the systems approach to public
defense requires that the approach target outcome improvement rather than
error avoidance. Ultimately, an emphasis on outcome improvement will
reveal sources of risk, target positive outcomes, and provide the data
necessary to improve the public defense delivery system. In order to target
outcome improvement, we propose that defenders collect and analyze data
about a wide range of risks and about the full range of defender actions"correct" and "erroneous"-that contribute to case outcomes. We believe
that these data can reveal which aspects of professional performance
correlates with improved outcomes and which aspects with negative
outcomes. It can also help highlight correlative factors influenced by
external stakeholders. As discussed below, this type of data collection and
analysis offers multiple opportunities for outcome improvement.
III. A DATA-DRIVEN SYSTEMS APPROACH TO THE DELIVERY
OF PUBLIC DEFENSE SERVICES
This part sets out to develop a data-driven systems approach to public
defender services. This part first constructs the goals and terminology of
the framework, and then addresses how to build a learning culture that
embraces such a data-driven vision. Finally, it offers a few concrete
suggestions on how to design the system.
A. THE GOALS OF A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO PUBLIC DEFENSE
The goal of a systems approach to public defense should be to
optimize outcomes for indigent criminal defendants by (1) collecting,
assessing, and analyzing data about the relationship between risks, defender
practices, and case outcomes; and (2) using those data to implement,
measure, and refine practices that simultaneously maximize the use of
defender resources and optimize case outcomes. 182
181. As discussed supra Part I.A, in the data-less world of public defense, it is difficult to know
whether, and to what extent, public defenders could "cure" rather than "mitigate" criminal charges
facing their clients.
182.
See,
e.g.,
Risk
Reduction
Program,
FED.
RAILROAD
ADMIN.,
http://www.fra.dot.gov/Page/P0049 (last visited July 3, 2015) (providing an overview of the Federal
Railroad Administration's risk reduction mission).
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Specifically, public defender systems committed to a data-driven
systems approach to public defense must:
•

Identify, collect, and analyze case data that will isolate risks
and performance factors that correlate with negative and
positive outcomes; 183

•

Generate best practices that target remediable risks and
generate practice norms that improve case outcomes;

•

Monitor and, as necessary, modify the implementation of
these best practices and the resultant measure outcomes;

•

Develop pilot programs that test strategies designed to
mitigate or eliminate the identified risks and promote outcome
enhancing performance; and

•

Maintain a feedback loop between ongoing data collection,
pilot program case outcomes, and best practices
implementation. 184

B. THE TYPOLOGY OF A DATA-DRIVEN SYSTEMS APPROACH TO PUBLIC
DEFENDER OUTCOME IMPROVEMENT

Below, we undertake a preliminary taxonomy of outcomes, risks, and
actions that might constitute the core data collection elements of a datadriven systems approach to public defense. We believe that this typology
will help illustrate the full potential of a data-driven systems approach. As
appropriate, we draw comparisons and analogies to the terminology used in
other high-risk industries' error management systems. As we offer these
suggestions, we recognize that to guarantee uniform data collection across
a wide range of practitioners and cases, a data collection system would
require even far greater definitional precision than this preliminary
typology. Our intent here is simply to establish a common framework with
which to showcase our proposals. To that end, we also offer practical
examples of how the collection and analysis of each category of data could
produce system changes that improve case outcomes.
1. Outcomes
Measuring outcomes is critical to any data-driven systems project.
Outcome measurement establishes the benchmarks by which an
organization assesses whether system-driven reforms produce tangible
183.
184.

See Beeman, Using Data, supra note 2, at 7; Risk Reduction Program, supra note 182.
See, e.g., id. (listing the Federal Railroad Administration's various risk reduction objectives).
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improvements. We may think that a well-funded public defender system
does better than a poorly funded system, but we cannot prove it without
data-based measurements of outcomes.
Under our framework, an "outcome" is a quantifiable case or client
result measured at the conclusion of an identified trial-level proceeding,
without regard to pending appellate litigation or appellate outcomes. 185
Examples of outcomes might include suppression of evidence (outcome of
a motions hearing), conviction (outcome of a trial), or five years of
incarceration (outcome of a sentencing). 186
In a data collection system, each outcome would be recorded
separately. Over time, each outcome would be measured against the
outcomes of other public defender clients. As discussed above, links
between pretrial release and ultimate sentencing dispositions could be
isolated and studied to show the correlation. In addition, other catastrophic
outcomes and adverse outcomes could be studied.
a. Catastrophic Outcomes
A catastrophic outcome is a final trial-level outcome that is
(1) adverse to the client's interest; and (2) either factually erroneous or
contrary to well-established law .187 Examples of catastrophic outcomes
include wrongful convictions, 188 sentences in excess of the legal maximum,
185. While one could also assess outcomes at the end of the appellate process (or even at the
conclusion of post-conviction relief proceedings), such a delayed assessment of outcomes poses a
powerful obstacle to the timely data feedback loop necessary for a successful systems approach. For
further discussion of the disadvantages of the delayed feedback loop in cases assessed after length postconviction proceedings, see infra Part IV.C, discussing the relative weakness of wrongful conviction
cases as the data pool for a systems approach to criminal justice.
186. Choosing what data to collect about case outcomes is itself a value-rich decision. As we
explain infra Part IV.A, we strongly urge the development of standardized national reporting protocols
so that defender analysts can engage in meaningful comparative analysis. We leave for another day the
precise taxonomy of any standardized project.
187. As noted supra notes 159-160, collaborative error reduction projects seek objectively
accurate case outcomes. In contrast, a public defender error reduction project seeks the best outcome for
defender clients, regardless of the accuracy of that outcome. So, a system-wide error reduction project
might identify the acquittal of a guilty person as an error that should be avoided. A defender errorreduction project would identify the acquittal of a client as a success, regardless of the client's legal or
factual guilt.
188. The acquittal of a guilty client is not a catastrophic outcome because that outcome is not
adverse to the client's interest. This highlights an important distinction between a defender-centric
systems approach to indigent defense and a collaborative systems approach to criminal justice.
Collaborative error-reduction projects seek objectively accurate case outcomes and would generally
define the acquittal of a guilty person as a catastrophic outcome that should be avoided. See Doyle,
supra note 2, at 110; Holloway, supra note 135, at 6, JO.
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and convictions obtained in violation of the statute of limitations. 189
In the wider criminal justice community, there is an assumption that
catastrophic outcomes are relatively rare. However, we suspect that there
may be widespread but unknown catastrophic outcomes that permeate
indigent defense, precisely because defenders lack a data-based lens with
which to identify them. Here, we do not refer to wrongful convictions,
although we believe that the wrongful conviction dataset is grossly
misleading given its disproportionate focus on capital and high-level felony
convictions. 190 Rather, we refer to the possibility that, in the data-less world
of overworked and under-resourced defenders, defendants may
experience-and defenders may not notice-more "routine" catastrophes,
such as illegal sentences or detention beyond the mandatory release date.
By adopting our broad definition of catastrophic outcomes, we hope to
facilitate the identification and resolution of these major injustices.
b. Adverse Outcomes
An adverse outcome is an outcome to the client's detriment that
compares unfavorably with the target outcomes established by the public
defender office. Adverse outcomes may be based upon assessments at the
conclusion of a specified trial-level proceeding (such as bail or motion
practice) or at the time that a judgment becomes final. 191
Of course, in order to evaluate an adverse outcome, defender
organizations will need either to track outcome progress across time or to
develop target outcomes. A target outcome is a benchmark goal that
determines, for data collection purposes, whether an outcome is adverse. A
normative target outcome establishes an outcome goal that tracks the mean
outcome for similar cases. An aspirational target outcome establishes an
outcome goal that (1) exceeds the mean outcome of similar cases; and (2) is
demonstrably achievable based on legal restrictions and upon data about
similar cases. 192 Office policy and institutional priorities will determine
189. As discussed infra Part III.8.3, catastrophic legal outcomes constitute an extant dataset that is
too small-and spread across too lengthy a timeframe-to create a meaningful data feedback loop.
190. Experts assert that wrongful convictions occur far more frequently than we know. In serious
felony cases, wrongfully convicted defendants languish in jail for decades while cases wind their way
through the appellate and post-conviction processes. In misdemeanor and low-level felony cases,
defendants plead guilty to avoid or reduce their jail time and accept their wrongful convictions as
another "collateral" consequence of their confrontation with state power.
191. For reasons explained supra Part II, transparency about the nature of a target outcome is an
important part of accomplishing defender buy-in of a data-driven systems approach to public defense.
192. See generally Ronda G. Hughes, Tools and Strategies for Quality Improvement and Patient
Safety in 3 PATIENT SAFETY AND QUALITY: AN EVIDENCE-BASED HANDBOOK FOR NURSES, supra note
106, at I.
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whether the office uses normative or aspirational outcomes, or a
combination of the two. 193
c. Practical Example
Suppose a jurisdiction imposes a six-month mandatory mimmum
sentence of incarceration for first-time, non-violent felons. Data within the
defender office demonstrate a mean sentence of one year of incarceration
for a first-time, non-violent felon who pleads guilty. In order to measure
outcomes, the defender office might track outcomes in those cases, seeking
correlative or causal factors. In addition, the public defender office might
establish a normative target outcome of one year of incarceration. The
office might then collect and analyze data to determine what risk factors
and attorney actions correlate with outcomes that meet or exceed the
normative target outcome.
On the other hand, perhaps the defenders' data suggest a correlation
between significant sentencing advocacy and sentences of less than one
year. 194 Acting on that data, the public defender office could establish an
aspirational target outcome. Because of the six-month mandatory
minimum, any target for a first-time, non-violent felon who pleads guilty,
would have to be between six months and one year. Moreover, the
aspirational target outcome should be demonstrably achievable, as
indicated by the available data on similar cases.
A strong data feedback loop would help each office set appropriate
aspirational target outcomes. If data indicated that a nine-month sentence
was an unrealistic target, the office might set a target of eleven months. Or
the office might use data feedback from identified risk factors and
performance variables to determine that a nine-month sentence is an
achievable target for defendants on pretrial release, but not for incarcerated
defendants. In that case, the office might establish target outcomes based
on the client's pretrial release status; the office might also shift its practice
focus to target pretrial release strategies.
2. Risk Factors
Central to the goal of improving outcomes is an understanding of the
risk factors that correlate to outcomes or outcome trends. A risk factor is a
193. Robust data will be essential to public defenders' ability to define normative and aspirational
target outcomes.
194. As discussed infra Part HJ.B.3, tracking the relationship between defender actions and case
outcomes is essential for defender offices to develop empirical evidence about what practices generate
outcome improvement.
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fact or circumstance that has a demonstrably high correlation with
(1) failed or erroneous defender actions; 195 or (2) catastrophic or adverse
outcomes. 196 Risks may be internal or external to the public defender
organization. Some risks will be routine and predictable; others will be
extraordinary and unpredictable. Regardless, defenders must collect and
analyze data about risks so that they can identify and vigorously combat
them.
a. Internal and External Risks
Internal risks are factors created by, or intrinsic to, the public defender
practice (for example, high caseloads or fatigued lawyers). If defender
offices correlate internal risks with negative outcomes, they can regulate
those risks accordingly. 197
External risks are factors beyond the control of the public defender
organization. Some external risks are societal or environmental factors. 198
Other external risks are factors created or controlled by national, statewide,
or local criminal justice stakeholders. Examples of such external risks
might include a state's mandatory minimum sentencing legislation, a police
precinct's policy of making custodial arrests (rather than issuing a
summons), a prosecutor's practice of vigorously prosecuting crimes
committed in wealthy residential areas, or a judge's preference for
detaining unemployed defendants. By documenting the relationship
between stakeholder-generated risks and negative case outcomes, public
defenders can persuasively advocate for stakeholders to change their
policies or practices.
195. See infra Part IIl.B.3.
196. See supra Part IIl.B. l.
197. In many instances, overwork may reflect attorney efforts to manage unreasonably high
caseloads. In such a case, the internal risk of "overwork" could also be characterized as an internal risk
of"unregulated caseloads" or an external risk of"underfunding." In other cases, overwork may reflect a
"workaholic" culture.
198. For example, since data demonstrate that, as compared with similarly-situated white
defendants, defendants of color experience higher rates of conviction and more severe sentences, a
defendant's race may constitute a factor that increases the risk of harsher charging, bargaining, and
sentencing outcomes. See, e.g., Casey Reynolds, Implicit Bias and the Problem of Certainty in the
Criminal Standard of Proof, 37 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 229, 241 (2013) ("Studies of jurors in recent
years have revealed differences in rates of convictions based on race, gender, and even weight."). See
also Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice
Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 201, 216 (2001);
Celesta A. Albonetti & Robert D. Baller, Sentencing in Federal Drug Trafficking/Manufacturing Cases:
A Multilevel Analysis of Extra-Legal Defendant Characteristics, Guidelines Departures, and Continuity
of Culture, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 41, 43 n.4 (2010) (listing studies researching the effects of race
on sentencing severity). So, if police and prosecutors identify a defendant as African-American, that
race-categorization is an external risk factor for a negative outcome in the defendant's case.
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b. Latent Risks
A latent risk is an undiscovered condition or practice that operates in
the "background" of indigent defense systems. Latent risks can be internal
or external; in either instance, they are hidden, unseen, and unidentified
factors that contribute to negative outcomes. Latent risks can be external
(for example, an undisclosed jail release procedure that discharges mentally
ill offenders before they have taken their medications) or internal (a public
defender case management system that fails to track release dates).
Absent a data-driven systems approach to practice, latent risks tend to
remain undiscovered until the investigation of a catastrophic outcome. A
vigorous data-driven systems approach to defense practice has the potential
to accelerate the discovery of latent risks by highlighting previously
unnoticed correlations between these background factors and case
outcomes. This is the same insight that many big data companies
highlight-that data reveal all sorts of unseen patterns that can improve
efficiency and services. 199
c. Cascading Risks
An effective data-driven system must connect the "cascade" of
multiple risks and events that are causally connected to each negative
outcome. 200 While lawyers (and appellate courts) are used to thinking about
legal decisions as a series of discrete decisions independent in time and
unconnected to others, in truth, past decisions affect future decisions. A
single failure to obtain a single fact (for example, a client's immigration
status) might have a significant impact on decisions further along in the
criminal case. Ignoring this cascade can produce inaccurate data about
cause and effect and can spread misinformation about the best practices for
outcome improvement. 201 This, in tum, "misplaces blame" and diverts
outcome improving resources away from the full range of institutional
structures that contribute to the negative outcomes. 202 An insistence upon
assigning a single cause to a case outcome masks the complexities of
practice in high-risk enterprises. 203
199. See Jonas Lerman, Big Data and Its Exclusions, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 57 (2013)
("Big data, for all its technical complexity, springs from a simple idea: gather enough details about the
past, apply the right analytical tools, and you can find unexpected connections and correlations, which
can help you make unusually accurate predictions about the future-how shoppers decide between
products, how terrorists operate, how diseases spread.").
200. Woolf et al., supra note 172, at 317.
201. See id. at 318 (discussing the consequences of ignoring cascading risks).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 317. For example, say that a patient's medical record contained the incorrect body
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d. Practical Example
Perhaps a defender office notices that workdays in excess of twelve
hours strongly correlate with negative outcomes. The defender office might
launch a pilot project that restricts attorneys to an eight-hour workday. If
that policy improves outcomes, the office may institutionalize it. If that
policy does not affect outcomes, the office might abandon the policy or
explore alternative reasons for the correlation between long workdays and
negative outcomes.
In many instances, overwork may reflect attorney efforts to manage
unreasonably high caseloads. In that case, overwork could also be
characterized as an internal risk of "unregulated caseloads" or an external
risk of "underfunding." In other cases, overwork may reflect a
"workaholic" culture. (Notice that defenders must track and analyze a
particular risk factor in order to develop the corresponding risk
minimization policy.)
While the identification of risk factors is an evolving process,
statistical criminal justice literature points to known risks that defenders
can use to initiate a data-driven systems approach to outcome
improvement. For example, pretrial detention correlates with higher rates
of conviction, 204 higher rates of custodial sentences, 205 and longer
sentences. 206 Moreover, people of color face a higher risk of being held in
pretrial detention. 207 Accordingly, an African American who is detained
before trial confronts a cascade of risks that disproportionately increases
the likelihood of an adverse verdict and sentence.
Armed with that knowledge, a defender office might focus on
improving pretrial release rates. To do that, it would conduct further
analysis about what factors create a high risk for detention in its
weight or that a laboratory report was missing from the record. Id. In those instances, the physician
might prescribe a correspondingly incorrect dosage of medication. If "counted as a single error and
given a single name, such as a prescribing error," then the data would suggest that the resulting adverse
event was caused by the physician's error in prescribing the incorrect dosage. Id. Such an
oversimplified analysis of the situation would fail both to consider and document other factors that may
have contributed to the prescribing error, such as overworked staff or disorganized laboratory
procedures. A more nuanced system, however, would accurately assess whether preceding risks and
errors were the cause of, or contributed to, the physician's ultimate prescribing error. Id.
204. Douglas Colbert, Ray Paternoster & Shawn Bushway, Do Attorneys Really Matter-The
Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1720 (2002).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1745-46.
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jurisdiction. These risk factors might be external (for example, the nature of
the charge, the identity of the presiding judge, or the defendant's race) or
internal (bond reduction motions filed without full investigation). Based on
its analysis, the defender office might establish a more aggressive bond
reduction practice in specific categories of cases, develop investigation
norms for bond reductions motions, or create a special category of
investigators who focus on bond issues. The defender office might also
educate the judiciary about the risk in order to encourage more openness
about pretrial release.
In the alternative, a defender office might focus on improving final
outcomes for detained defendants. If the office tracks weighted caseloads,
the office might assign a case weight multiplier for detained defendants.
This would rebalance lawyers' caseloads to reflect the additional work of
representing a detained defendant. Or the defender office might educate
prosecutors and judges about the relationship between detention and
outcomes as a strategy for negotiating better plea bargains and advocating
for better sentences.
We anticipate that many risks will be beyond defenders' capacity to
manage or mitigate. However, early warnings about those risks will alert
defenders about potential "hot spots" in their practice. Defender offices can
change their internal practices or work with other criminal justice
stakeholders to reduce risks. Ultimately, by attending to the relationship
between risks and outcomes, defenders can design institutional and
individual practice strategies to neutralize or minimize their effect on case
outcomes.
3. Defender Actions
A defender action is any action or omission by a public defender or
public defender staft2°8 made in connection with an individual case. We
have deliberately chosen to focus on actions rather than errors because of
the unique challenges of public defender practice.
Industrial safety experts define an error as "an occurrence in which a
planned sequence of mental or physical activities fails to achieve its
intended outcome."209 This concept of error may be useful in industries
208. While public defender systems may involve fewer independent actors than an aviation
incident or the death of a hospitalized patient, defender delivery systems can, and should, embrace nonlawyer staff as important resources in the improvement of outcomes and the appropriate actions that
contribute to optimal outcomes.
209. David G. Newman, Medical Team Resource Management and Error Prevention Training, in
MULTIMODAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT AND HUMAN FACTORS: CROSSING THE BORDERS OF MEDICAL,
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where the "in-house" participants control some or all of the other factors
that produce the intended outcome. However, in public defense, it makes
little sense to characterize attorney conduct as erroneous simply because it
fails to achieve its intended outcome. 210 The strong influence of external
criminal justice stakeholders means that a public defender might flawlessly
"execute a planned sequence of mental or physical activities" and
nevertheless fail to achieve her intended outcome. 211 Jury verdicts, judicial
rulings, and prosecutorial exercises of discretion can thwart even the most
brilliant strategy or technically expert cross-examination. 212 Accordingly,
the terminology of error is neither useful nor accurate in describing many
defender actions that contribute to case outcomes.
For similar reasons, we do not advocate developing a systems
approach that seeks to implement the "best practice" protocols already
established by defender organizations. 213 Best practices are those defender
practices that routinely enhance outcomes either across the board or in
discrete types of cases. While we have a strong subjective sense that many
existing "best practice" protocols may routinely improve outcomes, our
goal is to collect and analyze data that demonstrate which actions produce
the best outcomes. Only with empirical proof of a causal or correlative
relationship between a particular practice and enhanced case outcomes
should public defenders institutionalize any lawyering protocol as a "best
practice" to be replicated in a systems approach. Until defenders assemble
and collect data about inputs and outcomes, defenders cannot truly identify
best practices.
While we cannot generate data-free lists of best practices or errors, we
do offer a typology of the actions that public defenders should track.
a. Violations
A violation occurs when a member of the public defender organization
consciously fails to ·follow established procedures and protocols. 214 For
example, a public defender knows that her office requires documentation of
each client call, but refuses to document "very quick" phone calls
AVIATION, ROAD AND RAIL INDUSTRIES, supra note 115, at 271, 271 .
210. Salmon, Regan & Johnston, supra note 115, at 144.
211. Id.
212. As discussed infra Part IV, this explains, in part, why our proposal eschews a focus on
performance and error and adopts instead a systemic inquiry about the relationship between risks,
actions, and outcomes.
213. See, e.g., Standards for Attorney Performance, NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N,
http://www.mynlada.org/defender/DOJ/standardsv2/welcome.html (last visited July 3, 2015).
214. See Helmreich, supra note 39, at 782.
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reminding clients of their next court appearance. Violations may reflect a
cultural resistance to a systems approach to defending. In other high-risk
professions, violations "stem from a culture of non-compliance" or from
professionals' "perceptions of invulnerability. " 215
b. Slips
A slip occurs when a member of the public defender organization
follows established procedures but executes those procedures imperfectly
or incorrectly, and the imperfection is observable. 216 For example, if an
administrator made a visible error in a mandatory computer entry, that error
would be a slip. Slips may reflect ordinary human fallibility, or they may
signal that the organization has established "inadequate procedures" that
should be improved. 217 In collecting and analyzing defender actions, slips
should be distinguished from lapses.
c. Lapses
A lapse occurs when a member of the public defender organization
follows established procedures but executes those procedures imperfectly
or incorrectly, and the imperfection is undetectable absent a post-outcome
investigation. 218 Lapses can thus be considered a latent form of slips.
d. Deficiency
A deficiency occurs when a member of the defender organization acts
without the knowledge, skill, or judgment ordinarily expected of someone
in that position. 219 When a lawyer misunderstands a core legal principle
and as a result fails to preserve an important objection, that action
represents a deficiency. In that instance, the defender's legal knowledgeor lack thereof-is the characteristic that distinguishes the deficiency from
a slip or a lapse. Slips and lapses reflect ordinary human fallibility;
knowledgeable professionals execute the appropriate steps, but make
215. Id. See also Shappell & Wiegmann, supra note 107, at 3 ("Violations ... refer to the willful
disregard for the rules and regulations that govern the safety of flight. "). Shappell and Weigmann
distinguish between "routine" and "exceptional" violations. Routine violations "tend to be
habitual .. . and often tolerated by governing authority." In contrast, "exceptional violations appear as
isolated departures from authority, not necessarily indicative of individual's typical behavior pattern nor
condoned by management." Id.
216. See REASON, HUMAN ERROR, supra note 95, at 9.
217. Helmreich, supra note 39, at 782.
218. See REASON, HUMAN ERROR, supra note 95, at 9. Professor Helmreich categorizes both slips
and lapses as procedural errors, regardless of their visibility. Helmreich, supra note 39, at 782.
219. Cf Helmreich, supra note 39, at 782. In aviation, these are referred to as skill-based errors; in
the Human Factors Analysis Classification System, skill-based errors include errors due to inattention,
memory failure, or improper technique. Shappell & Wiegmann, supra note 107, at 3-4.
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ordinary human mistakes in their execution. Deficiencies reflect
unexpected professional ignorance: the professional simply does not know
what actions to take or how to correctly complete them.
Deficiencies also arise when "intentional behavior ... proceeds as
intended, yet the plan proves inadequate ... for the situation." 220 These
deficiencies reflect well-intentioned acts of poor judgment by defenders
who "either did not have the appropriate knowledge or just simply chose
poorly" among the available courses of action. 221 For example, a lawyer
demonstrates a deficiency if, for example, he either sets a court date of
April 15 for a client accused of tax evasion, or brings a client to meet with
an identification witness when attempting to establish a misidentification
defense.
e. Miscommunications
Miscommunications involve the exchange of incomplete or incorrect
information. Miscommunications can occur within the public defender
organization, in attorney-client communications, or in defender
communications with witnesses, members of the community, or other
criminal justice stakeholders. Misinterpretations of language, law, or
cultural barriers can create miscommunications. 222 Imagine, for example, a
lawyer who tells her client to come to court on a particular date but does
not communicate the time. The client arrives at noon for a 9:00 a.m.
hearing, by which point the judge has already entered a bench warrant for
the client's arrest.
f. Near Miss and Recovery Events

In aviation, catastrophic outcomes constitute a dataset too small to
provide meaningful information about systemic practices. 223 So, risk
management systems in aviation-and, to a lesser degree, in healthcarecollect and analyze data about near misses 224 and related recovery actions
in an effort to learn more about how to repair errors and improve
outcomes. 225 Near misses and negative outcomes share common causes, 226
so near misses are important resources for learning about, and preventing,
220. Shappell & Wiegmann, supra note 107, at 4.
221. Id.
222. Helmreich, supra note 39, at 782.
223. Weingart et al., supra note 39, at 774 (High profile medical catastrophes may "spotlight the
problem of medical error but provide little insight into its nature or magnitude.").
224. A near miss is an event that could produce a negative outcome but does not.
225. Barach & Small, supra note 39, at 759; Helmreich, supra note 39, at 784.
226. Barach & Small, supra note 39, at 759 ("[T]he same patterns of causes of failure and their
relations precede both adverse events and near misses.").
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negative outcomes. 227
In public defense, demonstrably wrongful convictions and other selfevident catastrophic outcomes are similarly rare. Studying defenders' near
misses is an essential way to increase the pool of data available for
study. 228 The burgeoning analysis of wrongful conviction data could
provide a useful dataset for comparison of near miss and recovery
events. 229 Successful identification and study of near misses will prevent
defenders from "underestimat[ing] the magnitude of risk and the extent of
harm" posed by their daily practices. 230

While developing precise data points is beyond the scope of this
Article, certain common actions and omissions can be tracked along with
outcomes. Correlating these actions or omissions with near misses will
allow for the development of a more robust understanding of how to avoid
repeating those actions in the future. Accurately identifying which types of
actions fall into which types of categories is the initial step to develop a
larger assessment tool to improve public defense.
C. DEVELOPING A SHARED LEARNING CULTURE THAT SUPPORTS THE
DATA-DRIVEN SYSTEMS APPROACH TO PUBLIC DEFENSE

As explained in Part I, there are significant obstacles to engaging
public defenders in such an ambitious program for data collection and
analysis. Thus, the first step must be persuading public defenders that this
data collection and analysis is an essential institutional priority. To succeed
in this endeavor, public defender offices will need to create an
organizational policy and culture that:
•

Obligates and empowers all defender employees-regardless
of their status-to identify and collect data concerning risks,

227. Id.
228. Id. Barach and Small explain that the reporting and analysis of near miss events has "been
institutionalised in aviation, nuclear power technology, petrochemical processing, steel production,
military operations, and air transportation." Id. (footnotes omitted). The "[c]omparison of near misses
with adverse outcomes offers advantages: (a) near misses occur 3-300 times more often than adverse
events, enabling quantitative analysis; (b) fewer barriers to data collection exist, allowing analysis of
interrelations of small failures; (c) recovery strategies can be studied to enhance proactive interventions
and to de-emphasise the culture of blame; and (d) hindsight bias is more effectively reduced." Id. at
760--61 (footnotes omitted).
229. See. e.g., Gould, Carrano, Leo & Young, supra note 9.
230. See Weingart et al., supra note 39 (High profile medical catastrophes may "spotlight the
problem of medical error but provide little insight into its nature or magnitude."). See also supra Part
III.B, discussing the implementation benefits of studying near misses rather than catastrophic or adverse
outcomes.
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outcomes, and performance errors or omissions;

• Encourages data disclosure by focusing on systemic causes
and reforms, rather than the discipline or disgrace of
individual defenders, and by making the development of
outcome-improving protocols part of the defender's
professional identity; and

• Identifies and encourages stakeholders who are necessary to
implement a systems-based approach.
Developing shared goals and a shared terminology are important, but
ultimately insufficient without also developing a shared learning culture to
support a data-driven systems approach. Such a learning culture must be
embraced by all of the key stakeholders in the public defense delivery
system-defenders, clients, and the community.
Successful systems for risk reduction and outcome improvement
depend upon stakeholders' cooperation with, and commitment to, the datadriven systems approach. Indeed, viewing "the continual improvement of
quality as intrinsic to the work itself' is a cultural characteristic common to
professions that embrace data-driven risk-reduction practices. 231 However,
creating a data-driven culture of improvement requires that participants
embrace data collection, error reporting, and an evidence-based feedback
loop for outcome-improving reforms. This Section examines how key
stakeholders in public defense can learn to benefit from a data-driven
system.
I. Defenders as Stakeholders
As noted in Part I, defenders resist data-driven systems. To change
this mindset, and thus the defender culture, defenders must understand,
value, and embrace the benefits of a data-driven systems approach. This
requires a cognitive shift toward systems-directed evaluation. The
system-not the lawyer or the lawyer's error-must be the focus. With a
systems approach, lawyers and supervisors will be more willing to identify,
report, and learn from their violations, slips, lapses, deficiencies and
miscommunications. Lawyers must trust that disclosures of these types of
actions will be used as meaningful opportunities to improve institutional
and organizational systems, rather than as narrow investigations intended to
blame-and-shame hard-working, but fallible, human beings.
231. Doyle, supra note 2, at 110 (quoting CHARLES KENNEY, THE BEST PRACTICE: HOW THE
NEW QUALITY MOVEMENT IS TRANSFORMING MEDICINE 30 (2008)).
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As a parallel example, prior to the medical safety movement, there
were
few
consistent "[m]easurement[s]
of performance
in
medicine ... because no one saw it as personally advantageous to be
measured."232 This anti-data approach was magnified by active use of a
person approach to error in traditional medical safety programs. 233
Accordingly, doctors maintained a "narrow focus on individual
performance to the exclusion of contributory team and larger social
issues."234 For doctors, data collection and error reporting were
"inextricably associated ... with a system of surveillance and post hoc
inspection, which had blaming as its sole purpose and public ignominy as
its only outcome."235 Successful implementation of a systems approach
required medicine to eliminate a culture in which people were afraid to
admit errors and replace it with one in which people understood that "every
defect is a treasure" in the hunt for improved outcomes and reduction of
error. 236 Thus, a demonstrable institutional focus on "system error" rather
than "human error" is an important factor in creating a culture of error
reporting. 237
In aviation, this same concern required assuring pilots and their crews
that safety experts wanted to differentiate between "unacceptable behavior
and blameless unsafe acts" because the blameless unsafe acts far exceeded
the incidents of unacceptable behavior. 238 Aviati on safety experts gathered
data suggesting that only 10 percent of operator actions were "culpable"
actions or errors and shared that data widely with pilots and flight crews. 239
This concrete information helped operators trust that "the large majority of
unsafe acts can be reported without fear of sanction."240
232. Id. at 120.
233. Barach & Small, supra note 39, at 761. Through morbidity and mortality conferences, grand
rounds, and peer review of controversial techniques and practices, medical professional reviewed
adverse medical outcomes to explore ways to improve future outcomes. However, until the 1990s,
assessment procedures tended to "search for errors as opposed to the myriad causes of error induction."
Id.
234. Doctors widely perceived each morbidity and mortality conference as a "dreaded ceremonial
warning that perfection was the requirement and individual responsibility for perfection was indivisible
and indispensable." Doyle, supra note 2, at 120. Although these conferences were intended to formalize
a system ofleaming-from-error, they "might as well have been designed to reinforce a determination to
treat every error as an operator error and every operator error as evidence of moral or professional
failing in the operator." Id. See also Barach & Small, supra note 39, at 761.
235. Doyle, supra note 2, at 120.
236. Id. at 121 (quoting Donald Berwick, Sounding Board: Continuous Improvement as an Ideal
in Healthcare, 320 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 53, 54 (1989)).
237. Doyle, supra note 2, at 109 (quoting PERROW, supra note 104, at 9).
238. GAIN, Roadmap, supra note 141, at vi.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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To facilitate a culture of disclosure, some industries, like aviation,
have successfully lobbied for legal structures that encourage-or even
require-error reporting. 241 Other industries have incentivized voluntary
reporting by providing guarantees of confidentiality or immunity from
professional discipline and civil or regulatory consequences. 242 For
example, in the aviation industry, the FAA conducts Line Operations
Safety Audits ("LOSA") for commercial aircraft. While the goal is to
intensively search for potential errors, the results of the audits are strictly
confidential; the FAA views this "non-jeopardy assurance for pilots [as]
fundamental to the process."243 In addition, the FAA offers immunity to
people who report to the Aviation Safety Reporting System ("ASRS"). 244
"The effectiveness of this program in improving safety depends on the free,
unrestricted flow of information from the users."245 Even more importantly,
if a person promptly reports an inadvertent error to the ASRS, the FAA will
waive all applicable civil penalties, fees, and certificate suspensions. 246
These promises of confidentiality, anonymity, and immunity are not
blank checks for error. Rather, they foster what James Reason calls a "just
culture,'' which creates "an atmosphere of trust in which people are
encouraged (even rewarded) for providing essential safety-related
information, but ... are also clear about where the line must be drawn
between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour."247
Administrators overseeing defender offices should borrow this "just
culture" approach to seeking accountability without personal blame to
improve the overall quality of defending. Recognizing that systemic errors
will occur, administrators and supervisors should see this as an opportunity
to fix these errors rather than to fix the trial lawyers. Information channels
should be designed to encourage confidential feedback about errors.
Reporters of the errors should be protected from retaliation or exposure. By
241. Id. at 15.
242. Barach & Small, supra note 39, at 762.
243. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ADVISORY CIRCULAR 120-90, LINE OPERATIONS SAFETY AUDITS
(Apr. 27, 2006), http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_ 120-90.pdf
[hereinafter FAA ADVISORY CIRCULAR 120-90].
244. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ADVISORY CIRCULAR 00-46E, AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING
SYSTEM (Dec. 2011), http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/AC%2000-46E.pdf. The ASRS website reports that
"[ m ]ore than one million reports have been submitted to date and no reporter's identity has ever been
breached by the ASRS." Confidentiality and Incentives to Report, AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING
SYSTEM, http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/overview/confidentiality.html (last visited July 3, 2015).
245. Confidentiality and Incentives to Report, supra note 244.
246. Id. NASA has a report documentation procedure that allows otherwise anonymous reporters
to retain proof of the date, time, and contents of their report.
247. GAIN, Roadmap, supra note 141, at 4.
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creating an inclusive reporting system, certain risks and inefficiencies will
be exposed. For administrators, the data may also reveal solutions to those
-problems.
Defenders themselves may also see advantages in this data-driven,
systems-focused approach. These benefits range from the professional to
the personal. Recognizing these benefits is important because for any
system to work, the end user (in our case, the defender) must buy into the
system.
First, the process of setting up a data collection system provides s9me
needed transparency to defenders about what they should be doing in their
cases. In order to collect data on defender actions, defender offices will
have to think through what lawyers do in different types of cases. As one
example of a data-driven approach to defending, the San Francisco Public
Defender's Office ("SFPDO") is pioneering an error prevention model of
practice. Funded by a federal grant, the office is developing practitioner
checklists to guide defenders through the best practices for defending
particular types of cases. The project seeks to create locally and nationally
applicable guides for defending criminal cases. 248 As of February 2014, the
SFPDO has created forty checklists for representing clients charged with
various crimes. 249 This checklist methodology is primarily an error
reduction approach to defending. However, the SFPDO also seeks to
generate data about the use of specific standards (inputs) in order to study
"actual criminal case outcomes, during periods of time immediately
preceding and following the implementation of checklists."250 This
evaluation of the relationships between inputs and case outcomes will
provide very valuable information for future data-driven projects.
Second, an outcome-oriented approach allows defenders to set
realistic expectations. 251 In a world without benchmarks, it can be hard to
248. Pamela MacLean, To Do Lists for Lawyers, CAL. LAWYER (Feb. 2014),
https://www.callawyer.com/clstory.cfm?eid=933203.
249. Id.
250. S.F. Pub. Def. Off., Checklists for Defense: A Training Strategy for Public DefendersSolicitation for Encouraging Innovation: Field-Initiated Programs, BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE 13
(2013 ), https://www .bja.gov/Funding/Field-San_Francisco_Public_Defenders_0 ffice.pdf.
251. Mark H. Moore, Alternative Strategies for Public Defenders and Assigned Counsel, 29
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 83, 92 (2004) (discussing the issue of professional pride and selfrespect that is compromised because of inadequate resources); Rodney Thaxton & Lida RodriguezTaseff, Professionalism and Life in the Trenches: The Case of the Public Defender, 8 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 185, 186 (1995) ("Because resources are so meager for public defenders ... living up to the
profession's expectations and standards is a constant and frequently futile struggle."). See also
Analytical
Support
for
Risk
Reduction
Programs,
FED.
RAILROAD
ADMIN.,
http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/Details/L03202 (last visited July 3, 2015).
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know whether you are succeeding or failing. One of the constant stressors
on defenders is the contingency of individual client outcomes. Seen
individually, these case outcomes may be devastating or unfair. Seen
systemically, these case outcomes may be quite normal. Such a process
may reduce attorney burnout rates and minimize the internal anguish of not
being able to do everything for every client. 252 Turnover rates in defender
offices are notoriously high, 253 leaving many defender offices primarily
staffed by younger, less-experienced attomeys. 254 Changing expectations
may encourage defenders to stay longer and develop their craft. 255
Third, data can establish performance indicators that are targeted to
252. See Rodney Uphoff, Foreword, 75 Mo. L. REV. 667, 673 (2010) ("[E]ven in the face of these
extremely trying circumstances, most of the defense lawyers handling indigent defense cases are
striving to do their best for their clients. Not surprisingly, frustrations mount as defenders struggle to
cope with oppressive caseloads and the burnout that often follows. Nor is it surprising that burnout
produced by these high caseloads leads to high turnover rates in many underfunded indigent defender
systems."); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Yoav Sapir, Keeping Gideon's Promise: A Comparison of the
American and Israeli Public Defender Experiences, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 203, 214-15
(2004) ("Largely due to the lack of financial resources, the public defense system lacks a sufficient
number of lawyers. The understaffing and lack of funding result in a situation in which the small
number of attorneys who are willing to do the work are burdened with high caseloads, tremendous
responsibility and pressure, a widely held presumption that public defenders are overworked and
unqualified, a sense of isolation, and the frustration of doing work that includes a large bureaucratic,
non-legal component. These factors lead many public defenders to burn out, and at the same time make
it difficult to recruit new lawyers to the field.").
253. Peter A. Joy, Ensuring the Ethical Representation of Clients in the Face of Excessive
Caseloads, 75 Mo. L. REV. 771, 785-86 (2010) (discussing the "individual public defender's personal
knowledge •hat she is failing to provide clients with the quality of representation they are entitled to
receive. Without the support of supervising and managing attorneys, there is an extraordinary high
turnover of line public defenders who seek other work rather than violate their professional obligations
to clients on a daily basis."). See, e.g., Aaron Bailey, High Turnover Plagues Public Defenders:
Increasing Caseloads, Student Loan Debt Put Some Missouri Lawyers in a Bind, ST. JOSEPH NEWSPRESS, July 9, 2007 (20 percent turnover rate); Susannah A. Nesmith, Dade Public Defender: Caseload
Is Untenable, MIAMI HERALD, July 31, 2008, at Bl; Jan Pudlow, PD-Il Grapples with Increased
Caseloads and High Rate of Public Defender Turnover, FLA. BAR NEWS, Nov. 15, 2008, at 1 ("[I]f PD11 continues to lose between four and five attorneys each month ... our turnover rate could be almost
double the l 8-to-20 percent it has been for the last five years.").
254. Ogletree, supra note 78, at 1294 ("[P]ublic defenders-who are engaged in work we all
regard as necessary to a just legal system---0ften bum out after a few years, leaving indigent defendants
with a largely young and inexperienced group of attorneys."); Smith, Too Much Heart, supra note 79, at
1238-40 (describing potential problems when staffing offices with "short-term defenders"); Jo Anna
Chancellor Parker, What a Poor Defense! Exploring the Ineffectiveness of Counsel for the Poor and
Searching for a Solution, 7 T.G. JONES L. REV. 63, 78 (2003) ("In a nationwide survey, sixty percent of
the directors of public defender offices indicated that the heavy caseload made it difficult to recruit
attorneys, and seventy-seven percent of defenders noted that "bum-out" was a common problem."
(citing Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary
Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 405 (1995))).
255. See Smith, Too Much Heart, supra note 79, at 1251-59 (discussing "craft" as a motivating
force to sustain a long career as a public defender).
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distinguish between units and case types. 256 Sexual assaults
are both felonies for caseload purposes, but require vastly
and energy to defend. Comparisons can be made at a much
level and thus can be quite useful not only to help manage
also the quality of lawyering in each case.
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and gun cases
different time
more granular
caseloads, but

Fourth, such an approach allows for improved feedback without
negative professional consequences. 257 In a system that values the
opportunity to assess the relationship between action and outcome, errorslike successes-become learning opportunities, not firing offenses.
Finally, such an approach may encourage lawyers to take full
advantage of the therapeutic benefits of reporting. 258 For any defender who
has woken up at 3:00 a.m. remembering the things he did not do in trial, or
the things he should have said in court, reporting can "bring closure" to the
ongoing stress and guilt of perceived personal failure. Again, this
therapeutic approach can help reduce burnout and stress among
defenders. 259
2. Clients as Stakeholders
Defenders work for clients. Thus, if the system does not benefit
clients, it should justifiably be resisted by defenders. Risk management and
outcome improvement obviously are important to clients because the
clients are themselves subject to those risks and dependent on those
outcomes. Thus, at least in terms of buying into the systemic focus, clients
should be supportive.
Clients may be unaware of (and uninterested in) the data collection
process. However, defenders must not overlook the information that clients
can provide about risks, defender actions, and outcomes. As the medical
profession learned, "[i]f patients are educated about the course of their
treatment and their medications ... patients can also be effective at
identifying errors."260 Any data-driven approach to public defense should
256. See. e.g., Analytical Support for Risk Reduction Programs, supra note 251.
257. Barach & Small, supra note 39, at 762.
258. Id.
259. Thaxton & Rodriguez-Taseff, supra note 251, at 187 ("As a public defender, you have a
substantial number of cases. As a result, you are under huge time pressures to deal with each case
expeditiously. With the large number of cases, you have the pull of one client versus another placing
demands on your time. How does one lawyer who has hundreds of clients provide the services as
advisor, advocate, and negotiator for each individual client? The answer is that the lawyer simply
cannot.").
260. Thomas W. Nolan, System Changes to Improve Patient Safety, 316 BRIT. MED. J. 771, 771
(1998).
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include client viewpoints. For example, in addition to tracking data about
traditional lawyering outcomes, defenders may choose to track data about
less-traditional measures of success, such as client satisfaction. 261
Finally, of course, collected data might be very useful for clients to
understand the quality of services that they will receive from defender
offices. Just as individuals choose to fly with airplane companies with
reputations for safety and choose to visit doctors with reputations for
competence, so too should indigent clients (and their families) have
information about the data behind the delivery of legal services. If those
data demonstrate a quality product, then clients and communities may have
more faith in the public defense system. On the other hand, if the data
suggest areas of improvement, communities will have the data to demand
change.
3. Community Stakeholders
Defenders work within a larger criminal justice system. Our argument
is that a defender culture that embraces the pervasive collection of data
benefits both the reporting individuals and the clients and community they
serve. While this Article focuses on public defenders, defender data can
also benefit the entire criminal justice system.
For example, North Carolina has adopted a statewide, outcomeoriented data project that systematically evaluates indigent defense
services. 262 Tasked with improving the provision of legal representation to
indigent defendants in North Carolina, the Office of Indigent Defense
Services ("IDS") began a comprehensive data-driven evaluation project on
defender services. 263 As set out in its 2012 evaluation report, the North
Carolina Systems Evaluation Project ("NCSEP") was established to create
data-driven evaluation tools to improve the delivery of defense services. 264
Based on systems analyses from other industries, the NCSEP established
goals, objectives, and assessment mechanisms to assess whether IDS was
providing quality indigent defense services. 265 The project "presents a set
of metrics to quantify system and client outcomes for indigent defense
employing the same methodology the nation uses to assess the country's
261. Gressens & Atkinson, supra note 67, at 50; Janet Moore, Marla Sandys & Raj Jayadev, Make
Them Hear You: Participatory Defense and the Struggle for Criminal Justice Reform, 78 ALB. L. REV.
1281, 1309-15 (2015).
262. IDS Commission Information, N.C. OFF. INDIGENT DEF. SERVICES, http://www.ncids.org/
IDS%20Commission/CommissionLinksPage.htm?c=IDS%20Commission (last visited July 13, 2015).
263. N.C. OFF. INDIGENT DEF. SERVICES, http://www.ncids.org/ (last visited July 13, 2015).
264. Gressens & Atkinson, supra note 67, at I.
265. Id.
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economic health, or public health agencies use to measure community
heath." 266 The key to this assessment measure is the creation and
monitoring of "performance measures/indicators," so broad go·als like
timely "access to attomey[s]" can be measured qualitatively through (1) the
number of days between arrest and appointment of counsel, and (2) the
number of days between arrest and the first client interview with the
attorney (including the type of contact, whether it occurs in person or by
video conference or telephone). 267 While the NCSEP is addressing broad
criminal justice system issues, rather than specific defender tasks, the focus
on data, measurement, and outcome assessment demonstrates the
possibilities of how to analyze indigent defense. Our approach, as stated,
adopts similar analytical tools but applies them with an understanding of
the specific role of the public defender.
Of course, even a community that reports data and discloses error may
not embrace the resultant evidence-based reform ideas that emerge from
the data. In order to create meaningful system reform that maximizes
outcomes, defender organizations must have both an institutional
commitment to and an operational appreciation of the benefits of this
approach. This includes public defender administrators, the courts, and the
local political infrastructure. Systemic change requires resources and
political will.
In aviation, data quickly demonstrated that the "latent failures" of
managers and of organizational structures and policies were significant
contributing factors toward negative outcomes. 268 Once field operators
realized that the data-driven systems approach could hold upper level
management accountable for policies that causally contributed to error,
they were more fully committed to a data-driven systems approach. In
addition, federal agencies and consumers were willing to respond to
failures with calls for change to improve flight safety.
Criminal justice systems have not always been so responsive to
remedying failure when it comes to providing resources to indigent
defender services. This reality may have as much to do with the political
powerlessness of marginalized populations as a lack of data. But, as has
been demonstrated in other professions, data matters. If defenders can show
the community the concrete benefits of data collection and analysis, it
266. Id. at 2.
267. Id. at 8.
268. Shappell & Wiegmann, supra note I 07, at 11 ("Generally speaking, the most elusive of latent
failures revolve around issues related to resource management, organizational climate, and operational
processes.").
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becomes easier to ask for additional funding, support, and attention. 269
Again, North Carolina-and all of its various stakeholders-has recognized
this approach, and has received significant support from the Department of
Justice and national defender organizations. 270
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR CREATING A DATA-DRIVEN SYSTEMS
APPROACH TO PUBLIC DEFENSE
This Article has set out to defend a data-driven systems approach to
public defense. In a future article, we hope to detail the specific data
collection points that would launch such an approach. In the interim, we
offer suggestions about common first steps that should guide the
implementation of such a system. Borrowing from medicine and aviation,
we argue that accuracy, integrity, and incrementalism must be central
components of the implementation of any defender data system.
A. ACCURACY IN DESIGN

First, data-driven systems are only effective if the data remain
accurate, current, and complete. Avia ti on' s successful risk-management
efforts depend heavily upon data taken from multiple sources. 271 Flight
crews and pilots participate in confidential surveys about team members'
technical performance, work ethics, teamwork, and leadership. 272 The
United States and other countries have well-established and non-punitive
mandatory national reporting systems that gather data about negative
outcomes and near misses. 273 In addition, aviation has established a wide
range of voluntary data collection systems. 274
269. Interview with Andrew Davies, Director of Research, New York State Office of Indigent
Legal Services (July 10, 2014).
270. See, e.g., Leff & Clark, supra note 18, at 7 ("Over the past four years, among the steps that
Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. has recognized as key to addressing the indigent defense crisis are
making model standards for public defense systems a reality; collecting better data, and increasing the
evidence base, in order to deepen understanding of the barriers that defendants commonly face in
securing effective representation."). See also Meg Ledyard & Mark Erwin, NCSEP Case Outcomes
Study: Travis County, TX Pilot Site, N.C. SYS. EVALUATION PROJECT (Sept. 25, 2014),
http://www.ncids.org/systems%20evaluation%20project/caseoutcome/introffravisCountyTX.pdf.
271. Helmreich, supra note 39, at 782; Barach & Small, supra note 39, at 762.
272. Helmreich, supra note 39, at 782. These surveys include questions about participants'
approach to error and error management; participant confidence in the confidentiality and anonymity of
these surveys is essential. As discussed supra Part II.A, building organizational trust in promises of
confidentiality or anonymity is a key aspect of creating a culture that embraces the systems approach.
273. Helmreich, supra note 39, at 782. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of how aviation and
medicine have established participant trust in these reporting systems.
274. Helmreich, supra note 39, at 782. Some of these systems are required by law, others are
"encouraged" by insurance providers, shareholders, and consumer advocacy groups.
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Any data-driven defender error reduction system needs to develop
channels to collect data from many sources (defenders, supervisors,
administrators, clients, investigators, analysts). This system design requires
the establishment of clear reporting standards and definitions of error. The
need for accurate and complete data makes it essential that public defender
offices adopt data collection systems that are both easy to use and offer
defenders visible benefits rather than merely increased work. 275
In practical terms, this means that defender data systems should be
designed with the job of the defender in mind. Those risks, actions, and
outcomes that are to be measured must be made manageable and clear. 276
When appropriate, systems should be automated and include mandatory
functions that prevent defenders from continuing with the task at hand,
without inputting the necessary data. Standardized processes that reduce
reliance on memory should be implemented. Checklists should be created
and filled out. Redundancies should be built into the system as double
checks. 277 Ideally, defender offices across the nation would collaborateperhaps through an organization similar to NLADA, the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the National Association of
Public Defense, or the Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent
Defense278-to develop standardized reporting norms. 279 These might be as
simple as developing a standard definition for measuring caseloads or
determining how to define "a case" for workload assessment. 28 Finally, all
of the stakeholders should be encouraged to report and contribute to the
data collection.

°

In the future, as technology develops, some of these steps will not
only be automated, but also observed by passive data systems. 281
Computers can record which client matter a defender is working on and to
whom she is speaking.282 RFID chips can be embedded in documents and
275. Beeman, Using Data, supra note 2, at 9.
276. DOYLE, MENDING JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 3-5; Beeman, Basic Data Toolkit, supra note 4,
at 5-7.
277. See Duke Univ. Med. Ctr., Systems to Reduce Errors, PATIENT SAFETY--QUALITY
IMPROVEMENT: ANATOMY OF AN
ERROR,
http://patientsafetyed.duhs.duke.edu/module_e/
reduce_errors.html (last visited July 14, 2015) (describing the medical field's approach to error
reduction).
278. These organizations are all national leaders of defender improvement.
279. See supra note 57 (addressing the challenges posed by the healthcare industry's lack of
standardized research protocols).
280. Beeman, Using Data, supra note 2, at I 0-11.
281. Don
Peck,
They're
Watching
You
at
Work,
ATLANTIC
(Dec.
2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/20 l 3/l 2/theyre-watching-you-at-work/354681 /.
282. Id. See also Steve Lohr, Unblinking Eyes Track Employees: Workplace Surveillance Sees
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court motions to track output connected to individual clients. 283 Locational
tracking can even measure the lawyer's efficient use of time in court,
investigation, or jail. 284 While obviously invasive to personal and
professional privacy, these technologies will provide insight about the type
of work a lawyer is doing for each client.
B. INTEGRITY IN DESIGN
The integrity of a data-driven system cannot rest entirely on defenders
alone. External checks to audit the data must also be created. As mentioned
earlier, similar audits exist in aviation. The FAA works with commercial
airlines to gather data about "normal" flight operations through the LOSA
program. 285 LOSA uses a live peer observation process to collect data
about flight crew performance. The FAA analogizes a LOSA audit to a
patient's annual medical checkup:
People have comprehensive checkups in the hope of detecting serious
health issues before they become consequential. A set of diagnostic
measures, such as blood pressure, cholesterol, and liver function, flag
potential health concerns, which in turn suggest needed changes to the
patient's current lifestyle. A LOSA is built upon the same proactive
notion. It provides a diagnostic snapshot of strengths and weaknesses
that an airline can use to bolster the "health" of its safety margins and
prevent degradation. 286

In a LOSA audit, experts sit in the cockpit and observe routine flights,
collect data about ordinary risks and errors, and note instances of noncompliance with established protocols. 287 LOSA data helps quantify daily
practice in non-emergent situations, with the goal of developing systemic
ways to manage and minimize the risks and errors that arise in the
"normal" course of business. 288
Similarly, medical safety systems now collect data from patient charts,
clinicians, computer modeling, malpractice claims, patient and practitioner
Good and Bad, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2014), http://www.nytirnes.com/2014/06/22/
technology/workplace-surveillance-sees-good-and-bad.html; Rachel Emma Silverman, Tracking
Sensors Invade the Workplace: Devices on Workers, Furniture Offer Clues for Boosting Productivity,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Mar.
7,
2013,
11:42
AM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424127887324034804578344303429080678.
283. Silverman, supra note 282.
284. Id.
285. FAA ADVISORY CIRCULAR 120-90, supra note 243 . LOSA is a voluntary safety program;
airlines choose whether to share their LOSA results with the FAA.
286. Id.
287. Id.; Helrnreich, supra note 39, at 782.
288. FAA ADVISORY CIRCULAR 120-90, supra note 243 .
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interviews, anonymous incident reports, and autopsy reports. 289 Medical
risk reduction systems also conduct real world observations (by in-person
observers and by direct and by video ).290 Observation audits, similar to the
LOSA audits used in aviation, have also produced important data about
medical risks, errors, and outcomes. 291 As in aviation, these multiple
sources of data are important accuracy enhancers. 292
To ensure integrity, defender audits may need to be instituted. Similar
to accreditation visits, such data audits will be very important to ensuring
that both system design and compliance are at optimal levels. These audits
will also provide the best evidence to compare risks, actions, and outcomes
across jurisdictions. Over time, the data collected may provide real answers
to the elusive question of what constitutes best practices.
Integrity also includes securing the data collected in the databases.
The information collected about clients, cases, and the larger system will be
valuable to others outside the defender organization. Establishing security
protocols to protect the data from external attacks or internal leaks will be
very important. Even within defender organizations, the temptation to
access the database to assist one client's case at the expense of another
client's privacy will need to be addressed. Tracking mechanisms for who
has accessed information will need to be created. In addition, encryption
software will need to be developed so the information can travel to the
defender's mobile electronic devices (in court, at the jail, etc.). Finally, new
rules about the scope of attorney-client privilege and third-party databases
will need to be formally adopted to ensure that traditional protections also
apply to shared institutional data systems.
C. INCREMENTAL IN DESIGN
While the framework proposed in this Article urges a comprehensive
data-driven approach to public defender services, financial constraints and
cultural concerns counsel in favor of advancing that goal with modest
289. Phillipe Michel, Strengths and Weaknesses of Available Methods for Assessing the Nature
and Scale of Harm Caused by the Health System: Literature Review, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 3 (Dec.
2003), http://www.who.int/patientsafety/research/P_Michel_Report_Final_version.pdf.
290. Gaba, supra note 39, at 785.
291. Weingart et al., supra note 39, at 774.
292. For example, a 1984 Harvard medical study that was long considered a "benchmark for
estimating the extent of medical injuries occurring in hospitals" demonstrated a 0.7 percent incidence of
adverse drug events among over 30,000 patients admitted to hospitals in New York in 1984. Id.
However, that study looked only at patient charts. Subsequent similar studies used computer modeling
and clinician reports to identify adverse drug events; those studies documented much higher incidences
of adverse drug events. Id.
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approaches. Defender organizations might begin by collecting and
analyzing data about discrete phases of the criminal justice process or about
discrete types of cases. Pilot projects could focus on one sub-area in one
jurisdiction.
In aviation and medicine, the earliest efforts at error reduction targeted
"low-hanging fruit" such as catastrophic plane crashes, dangerous "near
misses," and dramatic surgical errors. 293 For example, medicine's earliest
efforts at a systems approach targeted "[a]dverse drug events ... because
they [were] prevalent and preventable."294 Data soon demonstrated that
most medication errors were caused by mistakes in ordering and
administering medications. 295
However, in public defense, the "low-hanging fruit" approach may
have significant drawbacks. In public defense, the obvious low-hanging
fruit is the catastrophic error of wrongful conviction. One almost
unavoidable problem of starting with the most catastrophic errors is that, in
a data-less environment, there is no way to know whether those errors are
the most prevalent or even the most damaging.
Moreover, in aviation and medicine, a focus on catastrophic error
offers both a strong motivational buy-in and a relatively contemporaneous
opportunity to analyze the causes of the error. To the extent that focusing
on wrongful convictions would offer public defenders similar motivational
advantages, those advantages are strongly counterbalanced by the lengthy
delays between catastrophic outcome and correction in criminal justice. 296
Because of that delay, systemic practices that contributed to the wrongful
conviction may no longer exist, or new legal regimes may have mooted the
significance of those practices. 297
But "low hanging fruit" can also be more manageable projects that
pervade the criminal justice system. Despite a very broad mandate, the
293. Woolf et al., supra note 172.
294. Weingart et al., supra note 39, at 775.
295. Id.
296. Furthermore, in the intervening time between the wrongful conviction and exoneration, there
may have been significant changes in prosecution policies, defender practices, forensic techniques, and
constitutional criminal procedure standards.
297. See supra notes 259-264 and accompanying text. Moreover, the dataset of exonerations is
extraordinarily small. It is limited to the cases in which lawyers and judges are willing to invest
substantial post-conviction resources. Typically, those are capital cases, or cases involving life
sentences. They often rest on the use of DNA evidence to establish the error. Thus, the dataset is very
limited and, as many defenders suspect, wildly under-representative of the true number of wrongful
convictions.
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NCSEP has only targeted a few specific areas for initial study. 298 Because
of the complex nature of data systems, this step-by-step approach may
make sense. We encourage selecting smaller pilot studies that use dataand develop conclusions-with the potential for iterative reuse in later
studies.
CONCLUSION
This Article urges a cultural shift in public defense delivery systems.
The move to a data-driven systems approach may reveal, as matters of
cold, hard fact, the root causes of the crisis in indigent defense. Defenders
need to prove best practices by looking at real outcomes. Defenders need to
study outcomes by looking at the risks faced and actions taken by
practicing lawyers. Simply put, defenders need to see data as a teacher, not
a scold.
This Article ends by challenging national criminal defense and public
defense organizations to test its proposals on a national stage. A committed
national organization can create standards to begin the data collection
project across jurisdictions. As in other professions, this will require an
evolving commitment to shared language, goals, culture, and data points.
On a national level, defenders must begin to isolate, identify, and study the
things defenders are already doing and their relationship to case outcomes.
National data studies, probably funded by federal dollars, could begin with
pilot projects in certain cities. Those studies would necessarily require a
standardized national terminology modeled along the lines of medicine's
CPT codes.
Like an unpopular criminal defendant, the data-driven systems
approach deserves a fair hearing. There are many good reasons why
defenders have not embraced data-driven approaches to public defense.
There are equally compelling reasons why medicine and aviation are
imperfect models for data-driven systems of public defense. However, the
current public defender system is client-rich but resource-poor. By
embracing data, public defenders can do more to maximize their scarce
resources and optimize their clients' outcomes. A systemic improvement of
public defender services must begin with defending data.

298. These include case outcomes (as measured by client satisfaction), access to counsel, and
pretrial release. Gressens & Atkinson, supra note 67, at I.
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